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COLDER THAN A LANDLORD’S HEART? 
RECONCILING A DEBTOR’S AUTHORITY 
TO SELL PROPERTY FREE AND CLEAR OF 
A LEASE UNDER BANKRUPTCY CODE 
SECTION 363(F) WITH THE TENANT’S 
RIGHT TO REMAIN IN POSSESSION ON A 
LEASE REJECTION 




The question examined in this Article is a simple one—Can a tenant with a 
right to possession under section 365(h) of the Bankruptcy Code be ousted from 
possession by a free and clear sale of the real property by the debtor-landlord 
pursuant to section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code?  The Seventh Circuit, the 
only court of appeals to have considered the issue, said “yes” in Precision In-
dustries, Inc. v. Qualitech Steel SBQ, LLC and authorized a sale free and clear 
of the lease and the tenant’s right to remain in possession.  Subsequent deci-
sions from the district and bankruptcy courts are split, and most say “no.” 
This Article concludes that the answer lies in affording the tenant the same 
protection and priority against the property sold and the sale proceeds that the 
tenant has under state law.  The answer has nothing to do with whether one of 
sections 365(h) or 363(f) trumps the other, and the Code does not show that 
either does.  Rather, on a free and clear sale the tenants, mortgagees and other 
holders of interests against the property should be treated in accordance with 
the priorities of their respective bargained-for, prepetition state law property 
interests against the property.  Thus, if the lease has first priority, the sale 
should be subject to the lease and the tenant’s possessory rights under section 
365(h), or if the tenant whose lease has priority consents to the sale it should 
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be paid the first proceeds of the sale in an amount up to the value of the lease.  
If instead the lease is subordinate to a monetary lien or other encumbrance, the 
sale should be free and clear of the subordinate lease and of the tenant’s pos-
sessory rights, provided that the tenant is paid the value of its lease after pay-
ment to the holders of liens and encumbrances that are prior to the lease.  Ad-
mittedly, the tenant under a subordinate lease will receive nothing if the lease 
is out-of-the-money and there are no sale proceeds remaining after payment of 
the prior liens and encumbrances.  But that outcome, as cold as it may appear, 
represents the value of the tenant’s interest in the property sold. 
This result is compelled: (1) by the Supreme Court’s decisions in Butner 
and Nobleman, under which the property rights of parties in a bankruptcy case 
are determined by state law; (2) by 130 years of unequivocal pre-Code law and 
practice that characterized free and clear bankruptcy sales as hypothetical 
foreclosure sales under which the parties were treated in accordance the state 
law priorities of their interests in the property in sold, which Congress has 
never indicated it changed by enacting the Code; and (3) by the Code’s text 
regarding sales free and clear, adequate protection of interests in property that 
is sold in a bankruptcy case, and lease rejections, by the Code’s purposes of 
uniform and equitable distribution to creditors and maximization of the value 
of the debtor’s estate, and by the Code’s legislative history.  This conclusion 
preserves to the tenant in each case the value of its interest in the property sold.  
In the case of a first priority lease this may be the full value of the lease and in 
the case of a subordinate lease this may be zero.  But in each case, this rule 
vindicates the state law rights that the parties bargained for prior to the com-
mencement of the bankruptcy case. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
The stakes were high in the recent chapter 11 bankruptcy sale of the Revel 
Casino.  Revel asked the court to approve the sale of its casino under Bank-
ruptcy Code section 363(f), free and clear of its tenants’ leases.1  The tenants 
objected, asserting that another Code provision—section 365(h), which gives a 
tenant the right to remain in possession under a lease that a debtor-landlord has 
rejected—trumped any power of the debtor and the court to eject them on the 
sale.2
A section 363 bankruptcy sale free and clear of a lease and the tenant’s 
possessory rights suggests a narrative in which a “mom and pop” tenant is 
forced out of its space by the bankruptcy court at the urging of the debtor and 
its big bank lender, as well as other large creditors who reap a higher price and 
distribution on a sale of the real estate free of the lease.  The parties affected by 
the sale could just as easily be a tenant that is a national retailer with annual 
revenues in the billions, a community bank that holds the mortgage against the 
property, or other creditors that are local businesses whose needs are more com-
pelling.  The Bankruptcy Code makes no distinction between the two scenarios.  
Decisions on the law have gone both ways.  The Revel Casino contest went to 
the tenants, who were allowed by the district court’s ruling to remain in posses-
sion after the free and clear sale.3  Some commentators reveled in reporting that 
the tenants had reveled in their triumph.4
* Helen S. Balick Visiting Professor in Business Bankruptcy Law, Delaware Law School, Widener 
University, Wilmington, Delaware.  The Author gratefully acknowledges the insightful comments of 
The Honorable Thomas L. Ambro, Michael L. Temin, Professor Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Professor 
Richard Lieb, Professor Jules Epstein, and Professor David R. Hodas who read drafts of this article.  
The views expressed and any errors are solely those of the Author. 
1. IDEA Boardwalk v. Revel Entm’t Grp. (In re Revel AC), 532 B.R. 216, 227 (Bankr. D.N.J. 
2015) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2012)). 
2. Id. at 221 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 365(h) (2012)). 
3. Id. at 227 (“[A] § 363 sale does not and could not trump the rights granted to the Tenants by 
§ 365(h).”).  The procedural history of Revel is fairly complex.  The Third Circuit ultimately stayed 
the sale free and clear of IDEA’s interest in the property, but did not reach the question of whether a § 
363(f) sale can be made free and clear of a tenant’s § 365(h) rights. In re Revel AC, 802 F.3d 558, 
575 (3d Cir. 2015). 
4. Francis J. Lawall & Michael J. Custer, Casino Tenants Revel in Victory Enforcing Section 
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The question examined in this Article is a simple one—Can a tenant be 
ousted from possession by a free and clear sale of the real property pursuant to 
Bankruptcy Code section 363(f)?  The Seventh Circuit, the only court of ap-
peals to have considered the issue, said “yes” in Precision Industries, Inc. v. 
Qualitech Steel SBQ, LLC and authorized a sale free and clear of the lease and 
the tenant’s right to remain in possession.5 Subsequent decisions from the dis-
trict and bankruptcy courts are split.  At least one bankruptcy court has charac-
terized as a “vast majority” the lower court decisions—which now includes the 
district court’s in In re Revel AC, Inc.—that have concluded that a tenant’s right 
to possession is always protected on a free and clear sale under section 363(f).  
Those courts have held that the debtor or trustee in a bankruptcy case cannot 
use a free and clear sale to “get around” the possessory rights of a tenant under 
section 365(h).6  Most reviewers have similarly criticized the Precision Indus-
tries decision, some scathingly.7
This Article considers this question and concludes that the answer lies in 
affording the tenant the same protection and priority against the property and 
the sale proceeds that the tenant would have under state law had no bankruptcy 
ensued.  The answer has nothing to do with whether one of sections 365(h) or 
363(f) trumps the other.  The Code does not designate either section as supreme.  
Instead, on a free and clear sale the tenants, mortgagees, and other holders of 
interests against the property should be treated in accordance with the priorities 
of their respective bargained-for, prepetition state law property interests against 
365(h) Rights; Bankruptcy Update, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, July 17, 2015, http://www.thelegalintel-
ligencer.com/id=1202732348904?slreturn=20161128132751 [https://perma.cc/UG9K-EZ5L]. 
5. Precision Indus., Inc. v. Qualitech Steel SBQ, LLC, 327 F.3d 537, 540 (7th Cir. 2003). 
6. In re MMH Auto. Grp., 385 B.R. 347, 363 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2008). 
7. See, e.g., Daniel J. Ferretti, Eviction without Rejection—The Tenant’s Bankruptcy Dilemma: 
Bankruptcy Code Sections 363(f) and 365(h)(1)(A) and the Divergent Interpretations of Precision In-
dus. v. Qualitech Steel SBQ and In Re Haskell, 39 CUMB. L. REV. 707, 708 (2008) (Qualitech “incor-
rectly construed the two statutes in light of congressional intent and relevant policy issues.”); Bruce H. 
White & William L. Medford, Rejection via Sale of Real Estate: Is Your Leasehold Interest Protected?,
26 ABI J. 7, 28, 30 (2007) (“Qualitech and its progeny seem at odds with certain core bankruptcy 
concepts, such as that § 365 governs the treatment of leases and § 363 governs the sale of property.”); 
Michael St. Patrick Baxter, Section 363 Sales Free and Clear of Interests: Why the Seventh Circuit 
Erred in Precision Industries v. Qualitech Steel, 59 BUS. LAW. 475, 477 (2004) (“The Seventh Circuit 
rendered a substantively flawed decision completely opposite to the existing precedents” that “eviscer-
ates a lessee’s § 365(h) rights” and “creates an incentive for debtors to try to accomplish a stealth 
rejection of leases in an attempt to extinguish unwanted leaseholds.”). See also, e.g., Robert M. Zin-
man, Precision in Statutory Drafting: The Qualitech Quagmire and the Sad History of § 365(h) of the 
Bankruptcy Code, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 97, 127 (2004) (In Professor Zinman’s view, Qualitech 
“may well” have been rightly decided based on the statutory language notwithstanding the fact that, 
also in his view, “the Qualitech result was certainly not contemplated when the Bankruptcy Code was 
drafted.”).
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the property. 
Thus, if the lease has first priority, the bankruptcy sale should be subject to 
the lease and the tenant’s possessory rights under section 365(h).8  If instead 
the first priority tenant consents to the free and clear sale, the tenant should be 
paid the first proceeds of the sale in an amount up to the value of the lease.  That 
lease has value if the rent payable under it is below-market, so that a prospective 
buyer of the lease would pay the tenant the present value of the difference be-
tween the market rent and the lower rent under the lease.9  Each of these treat-
ments preserves for the tenant the value of the tenant’s first priority interest in 
the property being sold. 
If instead the lease is subordinate to a monetary lien or other encumbrance, 
the property may be sold free and clear of the subordinate lease and of the ten-
ant’s section 365(h) possessory rights, provided the tenant is paid the value of 
its lease after payment to the holders of liens and encumbrances which are prior 
to the lease.  Admittedly, the tenant under a subordinate lease will receive noth-
ing if the lease is out-of-the-money and there are no sale proceeds remaining 
after payment of the prior liens and encumbrances.  But that outcome, as cold 
as it may appear, represents the value of the tenant’s interest in the property 
sold and vindicates the state law rights that the parties bargained for prior to the 
commencement of the bankruptcy case, as does the different treatment of the 
tenant under the first priority lease. 
This result is compelled by all of the appropriate analyses.  First, under the 
1978 Code and the bankruptcy acts that preceded it, the property rights of par-
ties in a bankruptcy case are determined by state law.10  This doctrine requires 
that the parties’ prepetition, bargained-for, state law property rights in and 
against a debtor’s property, and their respective priorities, generally remain ef-
fective against the debtor’s property postpetition in the same order of priority.11
Second, under Supreme Court constructions of all four U.S. bankruptcy acts in 
effect since the 1840s, courts sitting in bankruptcy always have had the power 
to order the sale of a debtor’s property free and clear of subordinate interests in 
the property.12  Those free and clear bankruptcy sales were characterized as 
hypothetical foreclosure sales, and the court could compel each holder of an 
8. 11 U.S.C. § 365(h)(1)(A)(ii) (2012).
9. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES, § 7.4, Reporter’s Note (AM. LAW
INST. 1997). 
10. See sources cited infra note 16; Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54 (1979) (“Congress
has generally left the determination of property rights in the assets of a bankrupt’s estate to state law.”).  
11. Butner, 440 U.S. at 55 n.9.
12. See, e.g., Nugent v. Boyd, 44 U.S. 426, 436–37 (1845).
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interest in the property to accept a money satisfaction of its interest, to the extent 
of available proceeds, and in accordance with the same state law lien priori-
ties.13  This result also is required by the text of Code sections 363(e) and (f)(1)–
(5), 361 and 365(h), and nothing in the 1978 Bankruptcy Code or the amend-
ments to it indicates that Congress made any change to the parties’ prepetition 
state law rights or the deeply rooted pre-Code law of free and clear sales.14  Fi-
nally, the purposes of the Code are furthered by this result, and the legislative 
history of the Code supports it.15  In sum, Precision Industries was rightly and 
Revel in the district court was wrongly decided. 
II. THE SCOPE OF THE APPARENT CONFLICT
The Bankruptcy Code16 is a complex statute17 that provides for the compre-
hensive financial resolution of an enterprise or person who has failed.  This 
resolution entails the equitable distribution to creditors of a debtor’s property, 
or the proceeds of or rights in that property.18  The Code, by application of its 
13. See discussion infra Part VII(f).
14. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 363(e), (f)(1)–(5), 361, 365(h) (2012).
15. See discussion infra Part VII.
16. The term the “Bankruptcy Code” or the “Code” when used in this Article refers to the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978, as amended, which is the present bankruptcy law in the U.S. and is codified 
at 11 U.S.C. § 101 et. seq.  This Article considers pre-Code bankruptcy statutes and Supreme Court 
and lower court opinions under those earlier Bankruptcy Acts in reaching its conclusions.  The broad 
historical sweep of federal bankruptcy statutes in the U.S. is as follows.  The U.S. Constitution gives 
Congress the authority to “establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the 
United States.”  U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.  Bankruptcy laws were enacted pursuant to this power in 
1801, 1841, and 1867, each of which was repealed after several years without Congress’s replacing it, 
so that for most of the 19th century no federal bankruptcy law was in effect.  Bankruptcy Act of 1800, 
ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19 (1800), repealed by Act of Dec. 19, 1803, ch. 6, 2 Stat. 248 (1803); Bankruptcy Act 
of 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440 (1841), repealed by Act of March 3, 1843, ch. 82, 5 Stat. 614 (1843); and 
Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517 (1867), repealed by Act of June 7, 1878, ch. 160, 20 
Stat. 99 (1878).  With the passage of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 there has been no lapse in federal 
statutory bankruptcy law.  Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898).  The Bankruptcy Act 
of 1898 was substantially amended in the years following the onset of the Great Depression, most 
extensively by the Railroad Reorganization Act in 1935, ch. 774, 49 Stat. 911 (1935), and the Chandler 
Act in 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (1938).  The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as so amended, was repealed 
and replaced by the present Bankruptcy Code, which became effective in 1979, and has been amended 
several times since. 
17. Cent. Va. Cmmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 363–64 (2006) (“Critical features of every
bankruptcy proceeding are the exercise of exclusive jurisdiction over all of the debtor’s property, the 
equitable distribution of that property among the debtor’s creditors, and the ultimate discharge that 
gives the debtor a ‘fresh start’ by releasing him, her, or it from further liability for old debts.” (citing 
Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934))); Hanover Nat’l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 
186 (1902) (“The ideas attached to the word” bankruptcy “are numerous and complicated; they form 
a subject of extensive and complicated legislation.”). 
18. See Katz, 546 U.S. at 363–64.
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many provisions, balances the often-conflicting goals of maximizing: (1) a 
debtor’s opportunity to make a fresh start19 and, in chapter 11, to reorganize; 
and (2) the value of the debtor’s estate for equitable distribution to creditors,20
based both on the pre-bankruptcy property rights of the parties,21 and the ad-
justments to those rights and distributional priorities provided for in the Code.22
As with any extensive enactment, one provision may appear to conflict with 
another provision of the same law, both textually and with respect to the pur-
poses of the statute, as well as with other laws.  Sections 363 and 365 are two 
such provisions.  Section 363 authorizes the sale of estate property, both in the 
ordinary course23 of the debtor’s business and, with court approval, out of the 
ordinary course of the debtor’s business,24 thus maximizing value. 
Section 363(f) provides that the holders of “interests” in the property, in-
cluding liens and leaseholds, can be stripped of those interests against their will 
on the sale, but only if those parties, on their request, are provided with “ade-
quate protection” under section 363(e).25  “Adequate protection” of an interest 
in property that is sold free and clear is the “value of such entity’s interest in 
such property” under section 361.26  Thus, for example, if a property is sold for 
19. Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 367 (2007) (“The principal purpose of the 
Bankruptcy Code is to grant a ‘fresh start’ to the ‘honest but unfortunate debtor.’” (quoting Grogan v. 
Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286–87 (1991))); Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 77 (1904) (“Systems of 
bankruptcy are designed to relieve the honest debtor from the weight of indebtedness which has be-
come oppressive and to permit him to have a fresh start in business or commercial life, freed from the 
obligation and responsibilities which may have resulted from business misfortunes.”). 
20. Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, 554 U.S. 33, 51 (2008) (“Chapter 11 strikes 
a balance between a debtor’s interest in reorganizing and restructuring its debts and the creditors’ in-
terest in maximizing the value of the bankruptcy estate.” (citing Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 163 
(1991))); Bank of Am. v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434, 453 (1999) (Section 
1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) of the Bankruptcy Code is “intended to reconcile the two recognized policies under-
lying Chapter 11, of preserving going concerns and maximizing property available to satisfy credi-
tors.”); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 352–53 (the trustee “has 
the duty to maximize the value of the estate,” “an important goal of the bankruptcy laws”); Kothe v. 
R.C. Taylor Tr., 280 U.S. 224, 227 (1930) (“The broad purpose of the Bankruptcy Act is to bring about 
an equitable distribution of the bankrupt’s estate among creditors holding just demands based upon 
adequate consideration.  Any agreement which tends to defeat that beneficent design must be regarded 
with disfavor.”). 
21. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54 (1979) (“Congress has generally left the determina-
tion of property rights in the assets of a bankrupt’s estate to state law.”). 
22. Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494, 508 (1986) (the “overriding 
purpose of bankruptcy liquidation” is “the expeditious reduction of the debtor’s property to money, for 
equitable distribution to creditors” (citing Kothe, 280 U.S. at 227)). 
23. 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(1) (2012). 
24. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1). 
25. 11 U.S.C. § 363(e), (f). 
26. 11 U.S.C. §§ 361, 363(e) (2012). 
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$1 million free and clear of a $700,000 first priority mortgage and a $500,000 
second priority mortgage, the first mortgagee is entitled to payment of $700,000 
but the second mortgagee is entitled only to the remaining $300,000 of the sale 
proceeds, because with respect to each mortgagee that is the value of the 
holder’s interest in the property sold. The holder of a lease with a value of 
$100,000 that is subordinate to both the first and second mortgages will receive 
nothing, because all of the sale proceeds will be paid to the holders of the first 
and second mortgages, and the tenant’s interest in the property sold has no 
value.  This is the same treatment that will be afforded to the holder of a 
$100,000 third mortgage against the property.  It too will receive nothing, be-
cause its interest in the property sold has no value. 
Section 365, which gives the debtor the choice to either assume or reject a 
lease, also maximizes value.27  Section 365(a) permits a debtor to assume an 
advantageous lease, and to include the lease and its value in the debtor’s estate.  
If the lease instead is disadvantageous, the debtor under section 365(a) may 
reject it and thus be relieved of the financial burdens of it.28  A debtor-tenant 
that rejects its lease simply walks away from its obligations under it, and is 
relieved of its duty to pay rent and its other responsibilities under the lease.29
The landlord is left with nothing more than a rejection damage claim, which is 
payable at the same percentage as for other general unsecured claims.30
The situation is different when the debtor is the landlord.  Though the 
debtor-landlord who rejects the lease is discharged from its obligations under 
the lease (such as its agreement to provide heat, water, utilities and janitorial 
services), section 365(h) gives the tenant whose lease has been rejected the right 
to elect to remain in possession against the wishes of the debtor, provided that 
the tenant under the rejected lease continues to pay the rent less any amounts 
that it expends to fulfill the landlord’s obligations.31
Some courts have held that these possessory rights of a tenant under section 
365(h) survive a section 363(f) free and clear sale of the real property, whether 
27. For ease of reference I often use the term “debtor” throughout this Article to refer to a “debtor 
in possession” in a chapter 11 case or a “trustee” in a chapter 7 or chapter 11 case.  For readers less 
familiar with U.S. bankruptcy law, the debtor in a chapter 11 case remains in possession of its property 
and in charge of its own affairs as the “debtor in possession,” subject to court approval when required, 
e.g., when rejecting a lease or selling property out of the ordinary course of its business or free and 
clear.  By comparison, in a chapter 7 liquidation, or a case in which the court has appointed a chapter 
11 trustee, the trustee has the authority to act for the debtor and its estate, subject again to any court 
approval where required.  11 U.S.C. §§ 1101(1), 1104(a), 1107(a) (2012). 
28. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2012). 
29. 11 U.S.C. § 365(h). 
30. 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(g), 502(b)(6) (2012). 
31. 11 U.S.C. § 365(h)(1). 
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or not the lease already has been rejected or the lease is subordinate to liens and 
other interests in the property that exceed the value of the property.32  Other 
courts have determined to the contrary that the property can be sold free and 
clear of both the lease and the tenant’s section 365(h) possessory rights, pro-
vided that the tenant is paid to the extent of available proceeds following pay-
ment of any prior encumbrances, as adequate protection under section 363(e).33
The winners and losers in the resolution of this question can be considerably 
affected.  If the debtor in all cases can sell the property free and clear of the 
lease and the tenant’s possessory rights, then the tenant will be divested of an 
often-valuable asset.34  The tenant also may suffer substantial incidental dam-
ages resulting from the loss of a business location and the need to pay relocation 
costs.  If instead the lease or the debtor’s possessory rights under it in all cases 
survive the sale, then the holders of those mortgages and other interests will 
suffer a similar loss in value.35  A sale subject to the tenant’s possessory rights 
often will decrease the number of willing buyers and the amount that any of 
them is prepared to pay for the property, will leave some properties unsalable, 
and will deprive creditors, including the holder of a mortgage that has lien pri-
ority over the lease, of the recovery that they would otherwise receive. 
The difficulties in resolving this conflict came to the fore in the Seventh 
Circuit’s opinion in Precision Industries.36  In “this case of first impression at 
the circuit level,” the court was “asked to reconcile” these “two distinct provi-
sions of the Bankruptcy Code.”37  The bankruptcy court ruled that the free and 
clear sale order had “extinguish[ed]” Precision Industries’ possessory rights as 
tenant under a lease that was subordinate under state law to existing mortgages 
against the property.38  The district court disagreed and reversed.39  It reasoned 
that sections 363(f) and 365(h) conflict, and that section 365(h) contains the 
more specific text that “trumps” the more general terms of section 363(f).40  The 
32. See, e.g., In re Churchill Props. III, Ltd. P’ship, 197 B.R. 283, 288 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996); 
Precision Indus. v. Qualitech Steel SBQ, 2001 WL 699881, at *11–13 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 24, 2001). 
33. 11 U.S.C. §§  361, 365(e) (2012). See, e.g., In re Downtown Athletic Club of N.Y.C., 2000 
WL 744126, at *4–5 (S.D.N.Y. June 9, 2000); Precision Indus. v. Qualitech Steel SBQ, 2001 WL 
699881, at *13 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 24, 2001). 
34. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(e), 361. 
35. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(e), 361. 
36. Precision Indus. v. Qualitech Steel SBQ, 327 F.3d 537, 540 (7th Cir. 2003). 
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 542. 
40. Precision Indus. v. Qualitech Steel SBQ, 2001 WL 699881, at *13 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 24, 2001).  
The district court also noted that section 365(h) “does not expressly cross-reference any other provision 
of the Bankruptcy Code by way of limitation” and that the “available legislative history” discussed in 
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Seventh Circuit analyzed the text differently.  It determined that nothing in ei-
ther of the two sections suggests that one supersedes or limits the other.41  The 
Seventh Circuit further reasoned that section 365(h) is confined to a situation 
in which the lease is rejected, which had not occurred in the case.42  Section 363 
by comparison provides a mechanism other than possession for protecting a 
tenant or other party who is affected by a free and clear sale: the tenant is enti-
tled to “adequate protection” of its interest under section 363(e),43 most com-
monly by cash payment from the sale proceeds to the tenant for the value of its 
lease, after payment to the holders of any prior encumbrances.  The Seventh 
Circuit concluded that the property had been sold free and clear of Precision’s 
possessory rights under the subordinate lease, and reversed the district court.44
Since Precision Industries was decided, no other court of appeals has ad-
dressed the issue, though many lower courts including the district court in Revel
have.45  Decisions have diverged.  Most appear to have favored the tenant’s 
rights to unassailable possession under section 365(h) over a debtor’s section 
363(f) authority to sell free and clear, without considering the prepetition pri-
orities of the parties’ state law property rights.46
Squaring these two provisions of the same statute requires consideration of 
divergent and evolving interpretive regimes applicable to statutes.  One present 
battle line regarding the preferred approach for reconciling enactments that ap-
pear dissonant or ambiguous ostensibly divides textualists from purposivists.  
Textualists have been ascendant of late.  The most severe textualists claim that 
any statute is best construed by resort to deductive reasoning and interpretive 
canons applied to the enacted words themselves, with minimal if any reference 
to extrinsic evidence regarding either purpose or intent.47  The inquiry in their 
view should end there unless that analysis finds a statutory ambiguity or incon-
gruity.48  Purposivists generally assert that finding meaning can and should in-
clude at the outset a consideration of the purposes of the statute, discerned from 
other cases addressing the issue “also indicates that Congress intended to preserve the lessee’s estate 
in the event of rejection by a bankrupt landlord.” Id. at *14. 
41. Precision Indus., 327 F.3d at 547. 
42. Id.
43. Id. See also 11 U.S.C. § 361 (2012). 
44. Precision Indus., 327 F.3d at 548. 
45. Revel AC, 532 B.R. 216, 227–28 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2015).
46. See infra Part IV. 
47. See discussion infra Part VIII(A). 
48. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA AND BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION
OF LEGAL TEXTS 16 (2012) [hereinafter SCALIA AND GARNER, READING LAW] (“Textualism, in its 
purest form, begins and ends with what the text says and fairly implies.”); see discussion infra Part 
VIII(A).
38800-m
qt_100-2 Sheet No. 10 Side B      02/22/2017   09:25:38
38800-mqt_100-2 Sheet No. 10 Side B      02/22/2017   09:25:38
C M
Y K
GROHSGAL-P.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/20/17 3:51 PM
306 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [100:295 
both the text and extrinsic evidence, followed by an interpretation and applica-
tion of the enactment that is in harmony with and furthers the purpose that has 
been thus determined.49
In practice the dispute is not so pointed.  Most fundamentally, textualists 
consider purpose and purposivists construe text.  Both take context into ac-
count, are bound by and acknowledge precedent, and draw from extrinsic 
sources.50  The resulting pluralism is not anarchic.51  Rather, judges “generally 
have a ‘familiar framework for analysis and a stable set of concepts and tools 
that they use in explaining their statutory interpretation decisions.’”52
Moreover, battles between grand paradigms such as these often are fought 
in the midst of more pedestrian and specific rules on which there is consensus.  
A peculiarity in reading the Bankruptcy Code is that Congress has generally 
“left the determination of property rights in the assets of a bankrupt’s estate to 
state law.”53  Thus, the Supreme Court has held that liens, leases, and other 
encumbrances and interests in property are not “analyzed differently simply 
because an interested party is involved in a bankruptcy proceeding” unless 
some “federal interest” or “controlling federal rule” requires a different result.54
A second imperative that does not fit neatly into one interpretive regime or the 
other recognizes the significance of prior U.S. bankruptcy law.  The Supreme 
Court consistently has stated in this regard that it “‘will not read the Bankruptcy 
Code to erode past bankruptcy practice absent a clear indication that Congress 
intended such a departure.’”55
49. See, e.g., HENRY M. HART, JR. AND ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATIONS OF LAW 1374 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P. 
Frickey eds., Foundation Press 1994) [hereinafter HART AND SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS] (“In inter-
preting a statute a court should: 1. Decide what purpose ought to be attributed to the statute and to any 
subordinate provision of it which may be involved; and then 2. Interpret the words of the statute im-
mediately in question so as to carry out that purpose as best it can, making sure, however, that it does 
not give the words either – (a) a meaning they will not bear, or (b) a meaning which would violate any 
established policy of clear statement.”); ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES 31 (Oxford Uni-
versity Press 2014) [hereinafter KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES] (The purposive approach is “prem-
ised on the view that legislation is a purposive act, and judges should construe statutes to execute that 
legislative purpose.”). 
50. See KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES, supra note 49 at 31, 34–35, 46; SCALIA AND GARNER,
READING LAW, supra note 48, at 20. 
51. FRANK B. CROSS, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 18 (Stan-
ford Law Books 2009). 
52. Id. (quoting Morell E. Mullins, Sr., Tools, Not Rules: The Heuristic Nature of Statutory In-
terpretation, 30 J. OF LEGIS. 1, 4 (2003)). 
53. Nobleman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 329 (1993) (quoting Butner v. United States, 440 
U.S. 48, 54–55 (1979)). 
54. Butner, 440 U.S. at 54 (1898 Act case); Nobelman, 508 U.S. at 329 (1993) (1978 Code case).  
See also Lewis v. Mfrs. Nat’l Bank of Detroit, 364 U.S. 603, 609 (1961) (1898 Act case). 
55. Hamilton v. Lanning, 560 U.S. 505, 517 (2010) (citations omitted). 
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The thorny thicket that has grown up around the intersection between sec-
tions 365(h) and 363(f) holds the following critical questions: 
Does section 365(h) protect a tenant, even to the extent of disturbing state 
law lien priorities such that the tenant’s section 365(h) possessory rights under 
a subordinated lease obtain priority over all mortgages and other liens and in-
terests in the property, no matter their respective priorities under state law?  Or 
instead does section 363(f) authorize a sale free and clear of a subordinate lease 
and the tenant’s possessory interest on payment of adequate protection under 
sections 361 and 363(e) to the tenant and to the other parties who have an in-
terest in the real property in accordance with those priorities?; 
Do sections 363(f)(1) or (5) authorize a sale free and clear of a subordinate 
lease because “applicable nonbankruptcy law permits” such a sale or because 
the tenant under a subordinate lease could be compelled to accept a money sat-
isfaction of its interest in a hypothetical legal or equitable proceeding, such as 
a state foreclosure sale, without regard to whether such proceeding is actually 
and presently available to the debtor in possession or trustee?; and 
Is a tenant under a subordinate lease entitled, even if the sale is made free 
and clear of its interest, to adequate protection consisting of post-sale posses-
sion because that is the “indubitable equivalent” under section 361(3) of its in-
terest in the property sold? 
This Article’s thesis is that Precision Industries was rightly decided and 
Bankruptcy Code sections 363(f) and 365(h) conflict not at all.  This reconcili-
ation is compelled by the state law that determines both the interests in real 
property under the Code and the priorities of those interests.  It is supported by 
more than 130 years of unbroken, pre-Code bankruptcy law and practice that 
authorized the sale of real property free and clear of encumbrances and other 
interests, as though in a state law foreclosure proceeding, and without any re-
quirement that such an action was actually available to the debtor or trustee.  
Congress has never indicated, clearly or otherwise, that it was changing this law 
and practice in its enactment of the Code in 1978 or in any amendment since.  
This conclusion is reached whether one takes a textualist or purposivist ap-
proach or applies the more pluralistic method that I argue has been and contin-
ues to be favored by both the Supreme Court and the lower courts in interpreting 
the Bankruptcy Code. 
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part II summarizes the applicable provi-
sions of Bankruptcy Code, including sections 365(h) (regarding a non-debtor 
tenant’s right to elect to remain in possession on rejection), 363(f) (regarding 
free and clear sales), and 363(e) and 361 (regarding adequate protection).  Part 
III considers the district court’s and Seventh Circuit’s decisions in Precision
Industries.  Part IV briefly summarizes the post-Precision decisions.  Part V 
considers leasehold estates as state-law property interests under the Bankruptcy 
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Code, which have priority over some—and are subordinate to other—encum-
brances and other interests in the same real property, and the absence of a clear 
congressional command that alters those priorities on a bankruptcy sale of the 
encumbered property.  Part VI traces pre-Code Supreme Court and lower court 
precedents regarding free and clear sales and a tenant’s right to possession after 
rejection of the lease, in light of the Supreme Court’s interpretative rule that it 
will not read the Code to erode existing pre-Code law absent a clear indication 
that Congress intended such a departure.  These consistent pre-Code rulings, 
which date to the 1840s, established unequivocal authority for a court-ordered 
sale of a debtor’s real estate in a bankruptcy case, likened to a hypothetical state 
law foreclosure sale, free and clear of both monetary liens having priority and 
other interests including leasehold estates, liens and other encumbrances that 
were subordinate to that monetary lien.  Part VII briefly explores the textualist 
and purposivist schools of statutory interpretation, and the approaches to con-
struing the Bankruptcy Code taken by the Supreme Court in key cases.  While 
there are genuine differences between these two interpretive regimes and 
among the Justices in their interpretive inclinations, they are few and less sig-
nificant than is often asserted, and both approaches support the view that the 
Bankruptcy Code authorizes a sale free and clear of a subordinate lease.  This 
Part then examines sales free and clear of a lease and the tenant’s possessory 
rights on consideration of the text, purposes and legislative history of the Bank-
ruptcy Code. 
This Article concludes in Part VIII that a tenant under a lease that the debtor 
rejects should be entitled to remain in possession.  On a sale of the property 
under section 365(f), though, the tenant’s rights to continue in possession 
should depend on whether the lease has priority over or is subordinate to mon-
etary liens against the property. 
If the lease is subordinate to such liens that have priority, then the tenant 
should be subject to dispossession but should be entitled, on its request under 
section 363(e), to a monetary satisfaction as adequate protection under sections 
363(e) and 361(1).56  By the clear text of section 361(1), this adequate protec-
tion is “the value such entity’s interest in . . . property,” and equates to the value 
of the tenant’s leasehold estate in relation to the other interests and liens against 
the property in the order of their respective state law priorities.57  While this 
rule may result in the ejectment of a tenant under an out-of-the-money subordi-
nated lease without compensation for its loss, that outcome is a consequence of 
the parties’ respective, bargained-for prepetition state law property rights, and 
56. 11 U.S.C. §§ 363(e), 361(1) (2012). 
57. 11 U.S.C. § 361(1). 
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is identical to the result in a state law foreclosure proceeding.58  The opposite 
conclusion produces inconsistent and at times absurd results, including trans-
forming a subordinate lease and any leasehold mortgage that is secured by it 
into first priority encumbrances, while subordinating the encumbrances that 
previously had priority over the lease.  This outcome is in derogation of state 
law and the priorities that the parties bargained for prepetition when they en-
tered into these transactions. 
With respect to a lease that has priority over a mortgage or other monetary 
lien, the outcome should be different.  On a sale of such property, the tenant 
should be entitled to remain in possession of the leased premises.  This is the 
result that would obtain in a state law foreclosure proceeding on a mortgage or 
other monetary lien over which the lease had priority, and respects and pre-
serves the parties’ bargained-for, prepetition interests.59  The tenant under a 
lease with priority also may be adequately protected if it consents to the free 
and clear sale of the lease, in which event the tenant—which has first priority—
will be entitled to be paid as adequate protection the first proceeds up to the 
value of the lease.60  In either event, this treatment gives the tenant the value of 
its first priority interest and first claim to value in the property. 
This approach provides the tenant with “the value of [its] interest in such 
property”61 being sold, as required by sections 361(1) and 363(e) and (f), gen-
erally mirrors the result that would be obtained in a state law foreclosure pro-
ceeding, and consistently vindicates the parties’ bargained-for, prepetition state 
law property rights. 
III. KEY ASPECTS OF A LANDLORD-DEBTOR’S LEASE REJECTION, A FREE
AND CLEAR SALE, AND THE PROTECTIONS GIVEN TO THE NON-DEBTOR
PARTY UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
Section 365(a) enables a debtor to reject a disadvantageous lease whether 
the debtor is the tenant or the landlord.62  A debtor-landlord may opt to reject a 
lease if the tenant is paying less than market rental.63  But in such case section 
365(h) protects the non-debtor tenant by providing that on rejection it may elect 
to retain its rights under the lease, including the right of possession, for the 
58. See discussion infra Part VII(C)(3). 
59. See discussion infra Part VII(C)(3). 
60. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(f). 
61. 11 U.S.C. § 361(1). See also 11 U.S.C. § 363(e), (f). 
62. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2012). 
63. Id.  A debtor in possession in a chapter 11 case has most of the powers given by the Code to 
a trustee.  11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (2012). 
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balance of the term of the lease and any renewals so long as it continues to pay 
the rent.64  If the tenant elects to remain in possession, though, the debtor-land-
lord and its estate have no further liability for performance under the lease and 
the tenant may offset against the rent the cost of such performance.65
What if the debtor in possession or trustee elects to sell the property?  Code 
section 363 sets forth the rules.66  A debtor may sell its property “free and clear 
of any interest in such property of an entity other than the estate,” but only if 
one of the five conditions listed in section 363(f)(1)-(5) has been satisfied.67
These conditions are: (1) that “applicable nonbankruptcy law” permits the sale 
of such property free and clear; (2) that the other entity with an interest in the 
property has consented to a sale free and clear of its interest in the property; (3) 
that such interest is a lien and the sale price for the property is greater than the 
aggregate value of all liens on such property; (4) that there is a bona fide dispute 
with respect to the other entity’s interest in the property; or (5) if the party with 
an interest in the property being sold “could be compelled, in a legal or equita-
ble proceeding, to accept a money satisfaction of such interest.”68
The entity with an interest in the property is not stripped of the value of its 
interest on a free and clear sale.  Section 363(e) provides to the contrary that an 
entity is entitled to “adequate protection” of its interest on request.69  Adequate 
protection on a sale may be provided by one of three means: (1) a cash payment 
or cash payments “to the extent that” the sale “results in a decrease in the value 
of such entity’s interest in such property;” (2) “an additional or replacement 
lien to the extent that” the sale “results in a decrease in the value of such entity’s 
interest in such property” (which likely is not applicable to a sale free and clear 
of a lease, since the lease by most accounts is not a lien); or (3) by granting such 
other relief “as will result in the realization by such entity of the indubitable 
equivalent of such entity’s interest in such property.”70
A free and clear sale order typically gives adequate protection to the holder 
of the lien or other interest in the property that was sold by a cash payment in 
accordance with the first alternative of section 361.71  By the terms of the free 
64. 11 U.S.C. § 365(h)(1)(A)(ii). 
65. 11 U.S.C. § 365(h)(1)(A)(ii), 365(h)(1)(B). 
66. See 11 U.S.C. § 363.  Section 363 also includes the statutory provisions applicable to the 
debtor’s use and lease of estate property. Id.
67. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f). 
68. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(1)–(5) (emphasis added). 
69. 11 U.S.C. § 363(e). 
70. 11 U.S.C. § 361(1)–(3) (2012). 
71. See, e.g., Reeves v. Callaway, Ch.7 Case No. 12-2127 (4th Cir. filed Nov. 20, 2013) (un-
published per curiam opinion). 
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and clear sale order entered by the bankruptcy court, the interest is stripped 
from the asset sold, and the value of that interest in the property sold is then 
attached to the proceeds of sale in the same order and priority that it had against 
the property prior to the sale, as adequate protection of the parties’ interests.72
By the same or a subsequent order of the court, the proceeds of sale are then 
distributed in the order of the priority of those interests until the proceeds are 
exhausted.73  If, then, the only encumbrances against a property sold for $10 
million are a $7 million first mortgage and a $5 million second mortgage, the 
purchaser at closing would own the property free of those liens, and the two 
liens simultaneously would attach to the proceeds of sale as adequate protection 
for the loss of the value of each lienholder’s interest in the property that was 
sold.  The proceeds would be distributed as follows: $7 million to the first mort-
gagee, and the $3 million balance on account of the interest of the second mort-
gagee, with nothing left for the debtor’s estate.  If the property in this example 
only sold for $7 million, then the holder of the second lien or any lease that was 
subordinate to the first mortgage would be out-of-the-money, and would re-
ceive nothing from the sale proceeds.  This makes sense because the subordi-
nate lienor or subordinate tenant is entitled to nothing more in bankruptcy than 
“the value of such entity’s interest in such property”74 as adequate protection 
under section 361(1) or (2), and the value each of the those party’s interest in 
the property that sold for only $7 million is zero.75
This practice of reducing an estate asset to cash by a free and clear sale and 
protecting the holders of liens and other interests by attaching their interests to 
the proceeds in the order of their priority is long-standing, and predates both 
the 1978 Bankruptcy Code and its predecessor, the 1898 Bankruptcy Act, as 
discussed more fully in Part VI.76
72. See id.
73. See infra text accompanying notes 146–52.
74. 11 U.S.C. § 361(1).
75. The holder of the $5 million claim who received $3 million in the first example also will
have a $2 million general, unsecured claim for the balance of its claim.  See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2012). 
The holder of the $5 million out-of-the-money claim in the second example will have a $5 million 
general, unsecured deficiency claim.  But while a payment on account of an in-the-money interest in 
property will be paid dollar-for-dollar, the general, unsecured claim of the holder of an interest in the 
property sold that is partially or entirely out-of-the-money will be paid only the pennies-on-the-dollar 
amount that general, unsecured claims are paid in the case. 
76. See, e.g., Ray v. Norseworthy, 90 U.S. 128, 134 (1874) (1867 Bankruptcy Act case—”So
where the bankrupt court ordered the mortgaged premises to be sold, and directed that the mortgages 
should be cancelled and that the property should be sold free from incumbrance, rendering to the parties 
interested their respective priorities in the proceeds, this court decided that the bankrupt court did not 
exceed their jurisdiction, and affirmed their action.”).
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IV. THE PRECISION INDUSTRIES DECISIONS
Qualitech Steel Corporation owned a steel mill on 138 acres in Hendricks 
County, Indiana, encumbered by a first and second mortgage securing $380 
million of debt.77  About an acre of the facility also was subject to a ten-year 
land lease with Precision Industries, Inc., entered into weeks before the bank-
ruptcy filing.78  Precision had built a warehouse on that parcel that it agreed to 
operate for ten years for Qualitech’s apparent benefit and in consideration of 
Qualitech’s payments under a related “Integrated Supply Agreement.”79  Rent 
under the land lease was a nominal $1 per year and Qualitech had the right to 
purchase the warehouse for $1 after the expiration of the lease.80  Precision did 
not record its ten-year lease against the parcel on which it had built the ware-
house.81
A. The Bankruptcy Court’s Decision in Precision Industries
Qualitech sold the entire 138-acre facility at an auction authorized by the 
bankruptcy court.82  The high bid was the senior secured lenders’ credit bid in 
the amount of $180 million, which was about $200 million less than the total 
mortgage debt secured by the facility.83  The bankruptcy court approved the 
credit bid and issued its sale order.84  The senior lenders subsequently trans-
ferred their interest in the assets to New Qualitech.85
Precision’s land lease was not assumed in connection with the sale, and 
New Qualitech took possession of the leased property and the warehouse by 
changing the locks without Precision’s consent, authorization, or knowledge.86
New Qualitech then filed a motion in the bankruptcy court seeking to enforce 
and clarify the terms of the sale order.87
The bankruptcy court ruled in New Qualitech’s favor, finding that the orig-
inal sale order had unambiguously extinguished Precision’s lease.88  Precision 
77. Precision Indus. v. Qualitech Steel SBQ, 2001 WL 699881, at *1–2 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 24, 2001). 






84. Id. at *3. 
85. Id. at *2–3. 
86. Id. at *4. 
87. Id.
88. Id. at *5. 
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appealed to the district court.89
B. The District Court’s Decision in Precision Industries
Precision argued before the district court that the debtor’s failure to assume 
the land lease amounted to a de facto rejection of the lease, thereby giving Pre-
cision the option under section 365(h) to remain in possession for the remainder 
of the term and renewal terms.90
New Qualitech claimed that the free and clear sale order trumped Preci-
sion’s possessory rights under section 365(h).91  It reasoned that at the time of 
the sale the lease was subject to the two prior, recorded mortgages and that the 
sale proceeds were insufficient to satisfy the mortgage debt.92  Precision’s un-
recorded lease—”which was at least third in priority—would have been extin-
guished under Indiana law if the sale had been conducted by foreclosure.”93
Further, New Qualitech argued, references in both sections 363(f) and 365(h) 
to “applicable nonbankruptcy law” demonstrated Congress’s intent “to ensure 
that the result of a bankruptcy sale would be identical to the result of a state 
foreclosure sale.”94
The court considered the handful of authorities under the Bankruptcy Code.  
The district court in In re Downtown Athletic Club of New York City, Inc. had
held squarely that a free and clear sale under section 365(f) “overrides a tenant’s 
possessory rights,” and that section 365(h) applies only when a debtor-lessor 
rejects a lease and retains the property rather than selling it.95
In sharp contrast, the bankruptcy courts in In re Churchill Properties III, 
Ltd. Partnership and In re Taylor had held that a section 363(f) free and clear 
sale by a debtor-landlord could not divest a tenant of its possessory rights under 
section 365(h), reasoning that the specific provision of section 365(h) regarding 
a tenant’s possessory rights following rejection of the lease governed the gen-
eral legislation of section 365(f) regarding a sale free and clear of interests.96
Those courts also found that the Code’s legislative history evinced a clear intent 
89. Id.
90. Id. at *9 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 365(h)). 
91. Id. at *10. 
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 363(f)(1), 365(h)(1)(A)(ii)). 
95. Id. at *13 (citing In re Downtown Athletic Club of N.Y.C., 2000 WL 744126, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 
June 9, 2000)). 
96. In re Taylor, 198 B.R. 142, 164–65 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1996) (citing In re LHD Realty Corp., 20 
B.R. 717, 719 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1982)); In re Churchill Props. III, Ltd. P’ship, 197 B.R. 283, 288 
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996). 
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by Congress to protect a tenant’s interest when its landlord is in bankruptcy.97
The district court considered commentary critical of those decisions that 
contended that allowing a tenant to retain a possessory right under a lease that 
was subordinate to a monetary lien was unfair to other creditors and would not 
maximize the value of the debtor’s estate.98  However,” the court continued, 
“whether granting lessees strong possessory rights is the most sensible way to 
deal with a debtor-lessor’s unexpired leases matters little if Congress intended 
that result.”99  The district court held that “the more specific Section 365(h) 
overrides Section 363(f)“ and that there was “no statutory basis for allowing 
the debtor-lessor to terminate the lessee’s possession by selling the property out 
from under the lessee.”100
C. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ Decision in Precision Industries
The Seventh Circuit characterized the question on appeal as a “case of first 
impression.”101  It defined its task to be to construe the two statutory provisions 
“in such a way as to avoid conflicts between them, if such a construction is 
possible and reasonable,”102 and “to ‘give effect to each if we can do so while 
preserving their sense and purpose.’”103
97. In re Taylor, 198 B.R. at 165–66; In re Churchill Props. III, Ltd. P’ship, 197 B.R. at 288.  
The district court in Precision Industries also considered In re LHD Realty Corp. and In re Bedford 
Square Associates.  In LHD Realty the district court denied the debtor’s motion to modify or terminate 
a lease, stating its view that Congress in enacting section 365(h) intended “to make that section the 
exclusive remedy available to a debtor in an executory lease situation.” Precision Indus., 2001 WL 
699881, at *9, 13 (quoting In re LHD Realty Corp., 20 B.R. 717, 719 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1982)).  The 
district court in In re Bedford Square Associates ruled that a debtor could sell property free and clear 
of a covenant against the landlord’s altering a shopping center parking lot without the tenant’s consent. 
In re Bedford Square Associates, 247 B.R. 140, 146 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2000). The Bedford Square court
reached this conclusion after “weighing the interests of a debtor-lessor in maximizing its use of its 
property against the interests of a tenant in enforcing lease provisions.” Id. at 141. The district court in 
Precision thought that the “relatively narrow holding” in Bedford Square provided only “weak sup-
port” that section 363(f) prevailed over 365(h) for the purpose of dispossessing Precision from its 
warehouse facility. Precision Indus., 2001 WL 699881, at *13 (citing Bedford Square, 247 B.R. at 
141, 145 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2000), appeal dismissed as moot, Wal-Mart Real Estate Bus. Tr. v. Bedford 
Square Assocs., LP, 259 BR 831 (E.D. Pa. 2001)). 
98. Precision Indus., 2001 WL 699881, at *14. 
99. Id. (citing Steven R. Haydon & Nancy J. March, Sale of Estate Property Free and Clear of 
Real Property Leasehold Interests Pursuant to § 365(f): An Unwritten Limitation?, 19 AM. BANKR.
INST. J. 20 (2000); and Peter A. Alces, Unexpired Leases in Bankruptcy: Rights of the Affected Mort-
gagee, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 656, 674–75 (1983)). 
100. Id.
101. Precision Indus. v. Qualitech Steel SBQ, 327 F.3d 537, 540 (7th Cir. 2003). 
102. Id. at 544 (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974)). 
103. Id. (first quoting Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 267 (1981); then citing United States v. 
Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 453 (1988)). 
38800-m
qt_100-2 Sheet No. 15 Side A      02/22/2017   09:25:38
38800-mqt_100-2 Sheet No. 15 Side A      02/22/2017   09:25:38
C M
Y K
GROHSGAL-P.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/20/17 3:51 PM
2016] COLDER THAN A LANDLORD’S HEART? 315 
The term “any interest” in section 363(f) was sufficiently broad in the 
court’s view to include Precision’s possessory interest under the lease, a point 
that both parties conceded.104  Where the parties locked horns was whether the 
terms of section 365(h) conflict with and override those of section 363(f).105
The Seventh Circuit determined that they did not.  “First, the statutory pro-
visions themselves do not suggest that one supersedes or limits the other.”106
Second, the plain language of section 365(h) has a limited scope and applies 
only “[i]f the trustee [or debtor-in-possession] rejects an unexpired lease of real 
property . . . .”107  Third, each of sections 363(f) and 365(h) protects the tenant: 
section 363(f) by entitling the tenant, on its request, to adequate protection on 
a free and clear sale, and section 365(h) by giving the tenant a right to continued 
possession following the landlord’s rejection of the lease.108
The court reasoned that the two statutory provisions thus could be “con-
strued in a way that does not disable section 363(f) vis à vis leasehold inter-
ests.”109  The property could be sold “free and clear of a lessee’s possessory 
interest—provided that the lessee (upon request) is granted adequate protection 
for its interest.”110  But where the property was not sold, and the debtor rejected 
the lease, section 365(h) came “into play and the lessee retain[ed] the right to 
possess the property.  So understood, both provisions may be given full effect 
without coming into conflict with one another and without disregarding the 
rights of lessees.”111
The Seventh Circuit viewed its interpretation as being “consistent” with the 
express terms of each of sections 363(f) and 365(h) and as avoiding “the un-
welcome result of reading a limitation into section 363(f) that the legislature 
itself did not inscribe onto the statute.  Congress authorized the sale of estate 
property free and clear of ‘any interest,’ not ‘any interest except a lessee’s pos-
sessory interest.’”112  This interpretation was “also consistent with the process 
of marshaling the estate’s assets for the twin purposes of maximizing creditor 
recovery and rehabilitating the debtor, which are central to the Bankruptcy 
Code.”113  The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court, holding that section 
104. Id. at 545. 
105. Id. at 546. 
106. Id. at 547. 
107. Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 365(h)(1)(A)). 
108. Id. at 547–48 (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 363(f), 355(h)). 




113. Id.  (citing Steven R. Haydon & Nancy J. March, Sale of Estate Property Free and Clear 
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363(f) permitted the sale unencumbered by Precision’s possessory interest.114
V. THE DIVIDED POST-PRECISION INDUSTRIES CASE LAW ON SALES FREE
AND CLEAR OF A TENANT’S POSSESSORY RIGHTS UNDER THE LEASE
No court of appeals since the Seventh Circuit in Precision Industries has 
decided whether a free and clear sale under section 363(f) can deprive a tenant 
of its lease and possessory rights under section 365(h).115  A large number of 
district courts and bankruptcy courts have considered the question.  None of 
these opinions has taken issue with whether a lease or a tenant’s post-rejection 
possessory rights is an “interest” under section 363(f).116  Other than this area 
of agreement, the lower courts remain divided and no consistent line of author-
ity has emerged.117
A. Decisions Holding that a Proposed Sale Free and Clear Can Deprive a 
Tenant of its Possessory Rights under Section 365(h) 
Several cases have followed the Seventh Circuit in Precision Industries by 
harmonizing section 365(h) with section 363(f).118  Other cases have held cate-
gorically that a free and clear sale extinguishes a lease.119  A number of these 
of Real Property Leasehold Interests Pursuant to § 363(f): An Unwritten Limitation?, 19 AM.
BANKR. INST. J. 20, 22–23 (2000)). 
114. Id.
115. The Third Circuit in Revel ultimately reversed the district court’s denial of a stay of the sale 
free and clear of IDEA’s lease.  The debtor argued on appeal that it could sell the property free and 
clear because the question of whether IDEA’s interest was a lease was “in bona fide dispute” under 
section 363(f)(4).  The debtor apparently failed to assert that any of the conditions for a free and clear 
sale under section 363(f)(1)–(5) were satisfied.  The Third Circuit ruled that there was no bona fide 
dispute about the characterization of IDEA’s agreement as a lease, and thus that IDEA was likely to 
succeed on the merits, because none of the conditions of section 363(f)(1)–(5) were satisfied.  The 
court did not reach the issue of whether section 365(h) trumped section 363(f).  In re Revel AC, 802 
F.3d 558, 573–75 (3d Cir. 2015). 
116. See, e.g., In re Scimeca Found., 497 B.R. 753, 786–88 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.); In re Extra Room, 
2011 WL 846448, at *2 (Bankr. D. Ariz. Mar. 7, 2011); In re Haskell, 321 B.R. 1, 6 (Bankr. D. Mass. 
2005); and In re Hill, 307 B.R. 821, 826 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.).  See also, In re Downtown Athletic Club 
of N.Y.C., 2000 WL 744126, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 9, 2000); In re Taylor, 198 B.R. 142, 162 (Bankr. 
D.S.C. 1996). 
117. At least one district court has concluded, in considering a request for a stay of a sale, that 
the legal authority on this issue is in “equipoise.” See, e.g., IDEA Boardwalk v. Revel AC, (In re Revel 
AC), 525 B.R. 12, 26 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2015), rev’d, 802 F.3d 558 (3d Cir. 2015). 
118. In re R.J. Dooley Realty, 2010 WL 2076959, at *1–2, 7 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2010); 
Downtown Athletic Club, 2000 WL 744126, at *4; In re MMH Auto. Grp., 385 B.R. 347, 362–64 
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2008) (citing Precision Indus. v. Qualitech Steel SBQ, 327 F.3d 537, 548 (7th Cir. 
2003)).
119. In re Hill, 307 B.R. at 823, 825–26 (citing Precision Indus. v. Qualitech Steel SBQ, 327 
F.3d 537 (7th Cir. 2003)); In re Ng, 2007 WL 4365564, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Cal Dec. 13, 2007) (citing 
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and other cases have concluded that a hypothetical legal or equitable proceed-
ing satisfies the condition of section 363(f)(5) or found that the parties agreed 
to the terms of a money satisfaction.120  Some of these cases have expressly 
denied the tenant’s request for continued possession as adequate protection on 
the sale free and clear.121
B. Decisions Holding That a Proposed Sale Free and Clear Cannot Deprive 
a Tenant of its Possessory Rights under Section 365(h) and the Grounds for 
Those Decisions 
Most courts that have ruled that a free and clear sale under section 363(f) 
cannot divest the tenant of its possessory rights under section 365(h) have done 
so on one or more of three grounds.  First, a number of courts have concluded 
that section 365(h) trumps section 363(f), essentially following the view of the 
district court in Precision Industries (that the Seventh Circuit reversed) and the 
bankruptcy court in In re Haskell.122  Some of these decisions have directly 
referred to the general/specific canon of statutory interpretation and/or the view 
that a debtor cannot do indirectly, i.e., dispossess a tenant by a free and clear 
Precision Indus. v. Qualitech Steel SBQ, 327 F.3d 537 (7th Cir. 2003)); Hewlett v. U.S. Bankr. Court, 
2007 WL 3232239, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2007); Extra Room, 2011 WL 846448, at *1–2. 
120. See EEOC v. Knox-Schillinger (In re Trans World Airlines) (“TWA”), 322 F.3d 283, 291–
92 (3d Cir. 2003); In re WK Lang Holdings, 2013 WL 6579172, at *8 (Bankr. D. Kan. Dec. 11, 2013) 
(section 363(f)(5) was satisfied because the creditor “could be compelled to accept less than payment 
in full of the debt in a state law foreclosure and, to the extent the proceeds of the foreclosure sale were 
insufficient to pay the claims in full, . . . would receive an unsecured deficiency”); In re Bost. Gener-
ating, 440 B.R. 302, 333 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Jolan, 403 B.R. 866, 870 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 
2009); In re MMH Auto. Grp., 385 B.R. 347, 370–72 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2008); In re Gulf States Steel, 
of Ala., 285 B.R. 497, 508–09 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2002) (a hypothetical judicial or non-judicial sale or 
chapter 11 cramdown satisfies section 363(f)(5) (citing In re Terrace Chalet Apartments, Ltd., 159 
B.R. 821, 829 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1993) and In re P.K.R. Convalescent Ctrs., 189 B.R. 90 (Bankr. E.D. 
Va. 1995))); In re Lady H Coal Co., 199 B.R. 595, 609 (S.D.W. Va. 1996) (“[I]t is a ‘hypothetical’ 
satisfaction under (f)(5), since the subsection uses ‘could be’ compelled and not ‘must be’ or ‘shall be’ 
compelled.” (quoting In re WBQ P’ship, 189 B.R. 97, 107 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995))); WBQ P’ship, 189 
B.R. at 107 (chapter 11 cramdown satisfies section 363(f)(5)); In re Healthco Intern., 174 B.R. 174, 
176 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994) (The words “could be compelled” require only that the interest in question 
be subject to final satisfaction on a hypothetical basis, not that there be an actual payment, and the 
hypothetical payment referred to means also that a chapter 11 plan cramdown falls within section 
363(f)(5) “even in a chapter 7 case such as the present case.”); and In re Terrace Chalet Apartments, 
Ltd., 159 B.R. 821, 829 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (a hypothetical chapter 11 cramdown satisfies section 
363(f)(5)).
121. In re R.J. Dooley Realty, 2010 WL 2076959, at *8, 10 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 363(p) (2012)); 
In re MMH Auto. Grp., 385 B.R. at 372. 
122. See In re Haskell, 321 B.R. 1, 9–10 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2005); Precision Indus. v. Qualitech 
Steel SBQ, 2001 WL 699881, at *13–14 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 24, 2001).
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sale, what the debtor is restricted from doing directly by rejecting the lease.123
Following this reasoning, the courts have held that section 365(h) protects a 
tenant’s present or inchoate possessory rights upon a free and clear sale under 
section 363(f).124  Second, the same and other cases have denied a motion to 
sell free and clear of a lease and the tenant’s section 365(h) rights on the ground 
that section 363(f)(1) and/or 363(f)(5) permit a sale free and clear only if at the 
time of the bankruptcy sale a proceeding is actually available to the debtor-
landlord by which the tenant might be dispossessed of its lease and possessory 
rights.125  Third, the same and other courts have found that the tenant was enti-
123. See In re Revel AC, 532 B.R. 216, 227–28 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2015) (citing In re Churchill
Props. III, Ltd. P’ship, 197 B.R. 283, 288 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996)); In re Crumbs Bake Shop, 522 B.R. 
766, 777–78 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2014)). Cf. Haskell, 321 B.R. at 6–7. 
124. In re Revel AC, 532 B.R. at 227–28 (citing In re Churchill Props. III, Ltd. P’ship, 197 B.R. 
at 288, and the district court’s own opinion in In re Crumbs Bake Shop, 522 B.R. at 777–78 (addressing 
section 365(n), which gives a licensee of intellectual property similar rights on rejection to those of a 
tenant under section 365(h): “The specific language in § 365(n) should not be overcome by the broad 
text of § 363(f)”)). Compare Revel, with Compak Companies v. Johnson, 415 B.R. 334, 342 (N.D. Ill. 
2009) (approvingly citing Precision Indus. v. Qualitech Steel SBQ, 327 F.3d 537 (7th Cir. 2003) to 
stand for the proposition that “§ 365(n) would not prevent the trustee or debtor-in-possession from 
extinguishing a license in a sale of intellectual property free and clear of interests provided that one of 
§ 363(f)’s conditions was satisfied”); In re Zota Petroleums, 482 B.R. 154, 161 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2012) 
(citing In re Churchill Props. III, Ltd. P’ship, 197 B.R. at 288); In re Samaritan All., 2007 WL 
4162918, at *4–5 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2007) (following Haskell); In re Haskell, 321 B.R. 1, 6–7 (Bankr. 
D. Mass. 2005). Significantly, the Haskell court might have concluded that the tenant was entitled to 
remain in possession of the leased premises under contracts among the parties, rather than by the 
court’s construction of sections 365(h) and 363(f) with which I take issue in this Article.  The tenant 
in Haskell had obtained from the mortgagee a valid non-disturbance agreement with respect to its sub-
ordinated lease that provided that the lease could not be terminated by a foreclosure, judicial sale or 
similar proceeding under the mortgage.  Had the court based its analysis on the legal effect of this 
bargained-for, non-disturbance agreement, the lease and the tenant’s possessory rights under it would 
have survived the sale, vindicating the parties’ prepetition state law property rights per Butner and 
Nobleman. In re Haskell, 321 B.R. at 4. 
125. Dishi & Sons v. Bay Condos, 510 B.R. 696, 708–11 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014) (considering 
at length what it characterized as the “substantial and material differences” between a foreclosure sale 
and a voluntary sale, and holding that section 363(f)(1) “refers not to foreclosure sales, but rather ‘only 
to situations where the owner of the asset may, under nonbankruptcy law, sell an asset free and clear 
of an interest in such asset.’” (quoting In re Jaussi, 488 B.R. 456, 458 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2013)), and 
that section 363(f)(5) “should be read to reach only those legal or equitable proceedings that could be 
brought by the trustee as owner of the property”); In re Patriot Place, Ltd., 486 B.R. 773, 815–16 
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2013) (rejecting the argument “that a theoretical eminent domain proceeding could 
compel the tenant to accept a money satisfaction for its leasehold interest,” and failing to consider 
TWA); In re Haskell, 321 B.R. at 8–9 (Haskell cited but did not attempt to distinguish TWA, decided 
the year before, in which the Third Circuit held that a hypothetical chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding, 
in which the entity could be compelled to accept a money satisfaction (in that case zero), fulfilled the 
requirement of section 365(f)(5)).  Compare In re PW, 391 B.R. 25, 41, 45–46 (9th Cir. BAP 2008) 
(“Clear Channel”) (a free and clear sale under section 363(f)(5) requires “at least three elements: that 
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tled to post-sale possession as adequate protection under section 363(e), be-
cause the substantial claim secured by a mortgage having priority over the lease 
made it improbable that the tenant would receive any compensation from the 
sale proceeds, or because it was difficult to value the tenant’s lease and posses-
sory rights.126
VI. LEASEHOLD ESTATES AS STATE LAW PROPERTY INTERESTS UNDER THE 
BANKRUPTCY CODE AND THE TREATMENT OF SUCH PROPERTY INTERESTS IN 
A STATE LAW FORECLOSURE SALE
“Property interests are created and defined by state law” in a bankruptcy 
case, under the Supreme Court’s holdings in Butner v. United States and No-
bleman v. American Savings Bank.127  State law establishes the extent, validity, 
and priority of mortgages, leasehold estates, and other liens and interests in the 
debtor’s property, including real property that is sold free and clear sale under 
section 363(f).128  State law recordation acts and related real property and con-
tract law (such as that applicable to subordination agreements) determine which 
lien or other encumbrance has priority and which is subordinate.129 Butner 
made clear that “[t]he law of the State where the property is located accordingly 
governs a mortgagee’s right to rents during bankruptcy, and a federal bank-
ruptcy court should take whatever steps are necessary to ensure that a mortga-
gee is afforded in federal bankruptcy court the same protection he would have 
under state law had no bankruptcy ensued.”130  The continuation of state law 
property interests extends beyond secured creditors, and its purpose is broader 
than the protection of prepetition liens under nonbankruptcy law.131  The Court 
(1) a proceeding exists or could be brought, in which (2) the nondebtor could be compelled to accept 
a money satisfaction of (3) its interest;” the term “proceeding” means and is limited to a non-bank-
ruptcy proceeding currently available to the debtor (emphasis added)), with TWA, 322 F.3d 283, 291 
(3d Cir. 2003), in which the Third Circuit (J. Fuentes) affirmed the bankruptcy court’s determination 
that if (1) the third-party’s “interest” is “subject to monetary valuation,” that (2) in a liquidation pro-
ceeding under chapter 7 “would have been converted to dollar amounts,” then (3) § 363(f)(5) is satis-
fied. Id. at 291. None of Dishi, Patriot Place or Haskell analyzed the Third Circuit’s decision in TWA,
which reached the conclusion that a hypothetical chapter 7 proceeding sufficed. TWA, 322 F.3d at 291. 
126. Dishi, 510 B.R. at 711–12 (citing In re Haskell, 321 B.R. at 10); In re Haskell, 321 B.R. at 
9–10.
127. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) (1898 Act case); Nobelman v. Am. Sav. 
Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 329 (1993) (1978 Code case). 
128. Butner, 440 U.S. at 55 n.5. 
129. See id. at 55. 
130. Id. at 49. 
131. Id. at 55. 
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in Butner reasoned that, in a bankruptcy case, the “[u]niform treatment of prop-
erty interests by both state and federal courts within a State serves to reduce 
uncertainty, to discourage forum shopping, and to prevent a party from receiv-
ing ‘a windfall merely by reason of the happenstance of bankruptcy.’”132  This 
general protection and preservation of state law property rights in bankruptcy 
cases that was reiterated in Butner and Nobleman originates in the 1800s, long 
predating the Code.133
The Supreme Court in Butner, Nobleman, and the cases decided under the 
earlier Bankruptcy Acts recognized that applying state law to determine prop-
erty rights in bankruptcy furthers the fundamental purpose of the bankruptcy 
process as a predictable and orderly collective debt-collection device based on 
the parties’ prepetition bargained-for property rights.134  In the words of a more 
recent commentator: “Bankruptcy provides a collective forum for sorting out 
the rights of ‘owners’ (creditors and others with rights against a debtor’s assets) 
and can be justified because it provides protection against the destructive effects 
of an individual remedies system when there are not enough assets to go 
around.”135  Giving these creditors and others greater rights in bankruptcy than 
they would have outside of it conflicts with the collectivization goal, because 
such changes “create incentives for particular holders of rights in assets to resort 
to bankruptcy in order to gain for themselves the advantages of those changes, 
even when a bankruptcy proceeding would not be in the collective interest of 
the investor group.”136
To put this another way, in its role as a collective debt-collection device, 
bankruptcy law should not create rights.  Instead, it should act to ensure that 
132. Id. (quoting Lewis v. Mfrs. Nat’l Bank, 364 U.S. 603, 609 (1961) (1898 Act Case)). 
133. See, e.g., Nugent v. Boyd, 44 U.S. 426, 436 (1845) (“It is quite clear that the liens and 
mortgages which are valid under the state law must be protected by the District Court of the United 
States, sitting in bankruptcy.”).  The last clause of section 2 of the 1841 Act stated: “And provided, 
also, That nothing in this act contained shall be construed to annul, destroy, or impair any lawful rights 
of married women, or minors, or any liens, mortgages, or other securities on property, real or personal, 
which may be valid by the laws of the States respectively, and which are not inconsistent with the 
provisions of the second and fifth sections of this act.” Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440 
(1841); Bd. of Trade of City of Chi. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 1, 10 (1924) (“Congress derives its power to 
enact a bankrupt law from the Federal Constitution, and the construction of it is a federal question.  Of 
course, where the bankrupt law deals with property rights that are regulated by the state law, the federal 
courts in bankruptcy will follow the state courts; but when the language of Congress indicates a policy 
requiring a broader construction of the statute than the state decisions would give it, federal courts 
cannot be concluded by them.”). 
134. See Butner, 440 U.S. at 55; Nobelman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 329 (1993). 
135. THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 20 (Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1986). 
136. Id. at 21. 
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such rights that exist are vindicated to the extent possible.  “Only in this way 
can bankruptcy law minimize the conversion costs of transferring an insolvent 
debtor’s assets to its creditors.”137
That is not to say that the Bankruptcy Code is in all regards beholden to 
state law in a bankruptcy proceeding.  The court in Butner also observed that: 
“The constitutional authority of Congress to establish ‘uniform Laws on the 
subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States’ would clearly encompass 
a federal statute” changing those rights.138 Butner recognized that a “congres-
sional command” or other “identifiable federal interest” (as distinguished from 
merely equitable considerations) can alter the effect of state law.139
How do these principles apply to a real property lease, and to the rights of 
the tenant on a sale of the property?  Under state law, a lease differs from other 
contracts because it is both a conveyance of an estate in and against real prop-
erty and a contract, whether the term of the lease is a month or a century.140
“The concept that a lease was a conveyance was said to have been firmly es-
tablished by 1500 . . . .  Adding covenants to a lease made the lease a convey-
ance and a contract.”141
State law also establishes proceedings for the liquidation of real property 
that is encumbered by liens, leases, and other interests, and for the satisfaction 
of those property interests from the proceeds of sale.142  The most common ac-
tion is a foreclosure sale.  In a state law foreclosure proceeding, a leasehold 
estate is treated as an encumbrance that either is subordinate to or has priority 
over a mortgage and other encumbrances against the real property.143  A fore-
closure of a mortgage terminates a junior interest, such as a subordinate lease-
hold interest, if the holder of the junior interest is joined in the action and noti-
fied.144  By contrast, a foreclosure of the mortgage “does not terminate interests 
in the foreclosed real estate that are senior to the mortgage being foreclosed.”145
Thus, if a mortgage is first granted and recorded against the property, and 
the property owner later enters into a lease (which being later in time is subor-
dinate to the first mortgage), then upon foreclosure of the first mortgage the 
137. Id. at 22. 
138. Butner, 440 U.S. at 54. 
139. Id. at 55. 
140. MILTON R. FRIEDMAN, FRIEDMAN ON LEASES 1–16, 1–17 (Patrick A. Randolph Jr. ed., 5th 
ed. 2015), https://www.bloomberglaw.com//document/6905785896. 
141. Id. at 1–15. 
142. Butner, 440 U.S. at 54 (1979). 
143. Id. at 55. 
144. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES, § 7.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1997).
145. Id.
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purchaser at the foreclosure sale will own the property free and clear of the 
subordinate lease and the tenant’s interest.146  If by comparison a second mort-
gage is given and recorded after the first mortgage and the tenant’s execution 
of and possession under the lease, and the foreclosure is on the second mort-
gage, then both the first mortgage and the lease will survive.  The purchaser at 
the foreclosure sale will own the property free and clear of the second mortgage 
and the owner’s interest, but subject to the first mortgage and the lease.147
The Restatement (Third) of Property: Mortgages sets forth the current state 
law rule.148  The foreclosure sale proceeds are first paid in satisfaction of the 
mortgage obligation foreclosed on, and any surplus is then paid to the holders 
of subordinate liens and other interests terminated by the foreclosure, in the 
order of their priority, as follows: 
7.4 Effect of Priority on the Disposition of Foreclosure Surplus 
When the foreclosure sale price exceeds the amount of the 
mortgage obligation, the surplus is applied to liens and other 
interests terminated by the foreclosure in order of their priority 
and the remaining balance, if any, is distributed to the holder 
of the equity of redemption.149
“Non-lienors who hold interests in the real estate that are terminated by 
foreclosure are also entitled to share in any foreclosure surplus.  Such persons 
include junior easement holders and lessees.  To the extent that surplus is avail-
able, such persons are entitled to receive, in order of their pre-foreclosure pri-
ority, the fair market value of their interests as of the date of foreclosure.”150
Thus, on extinguishment of a subordinate lease, any surplus after satisfaction 
of the prior mortgage obligation “is first applied to pay Tenant the fair market 
value of leasehold terminated by the foreclosure,” and then, if any of the surplus 
still remains, to holder of the equity of redemption, i.e., the owner.151
Cases and treatises pre-dating the Restatement (Third) of Property: Mort-
gages pronounced the same rules.  The New York Court of Appeals in the 1871 
case of Clarkson v. Skidmore, for example, stated that: 
A lessee for years of mortgaged premises, . . . upon foreclosure 
and sale under the mortgage, is entitled to receive, out of the 
surplus moneys, the value of the use of the premises for the 
146. Id. at § 7.1 cmt. a, illus. 4. 
147. Id. at § 7.1 cmt. a, illus. 7. 
148. See id. at introductory cmt. 
149. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES, § 7.4 (AM. LAW INST. 1997).
150. Id. at § 7.4 cmt. b, illus. 3. 
151. Id. at § 7.4 cmt. b, illus. 5. 
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remainder of his term, less the rents reserved and other pay-
ments to be made by him under the lease.152
Aron in The Gist of Real Property Law wrote in 1916 that the “tenant must 
yield” unless “his lease is prior to the mortgage and he is in possession or the 
lease is recorded, if required by statute to be recorded, as in New York and New 
Jersey, when for over three years.”153  Wiltsie in his 1913 A Treatise on the Law 
and Practice of Foreclosing Mortgages on Real Property: and of Remedies 
Collateral Thereto: with Forms stated: 
If a tenant is made a party and his rights are cut off by the ac-
tion, he will be entitled from the surplus money, if any, to the 
value of his unexpired term and damages for ejectment . . . .154
The question under Butner and Nobleman then is whether the Bankruptcy 
Code contains a clear “congressional command” or protects an “identifiable 
federal interest” that alters the effect of state law on a court-ordered sale.155  The 
answer is clearly “no.” 
It is true that section 365(h) contains a “congressional command” to protect 
a tenant whose debtor-landlord rejects the lease.156  That section prevents a 
debtor from stripping a disadvantageous lease from the real property and re-
taining, as a windfall, the property unburdened by those leases.157
But Congress also has commanded, in sections 363(e) and (f) and 361, that 
if the debtor instead sells the property free and clear the parties are entitled to 
the value of their state law interests in the property sold, in accordance with the 
respective priorities of those interests.158  “Adequate protection” must be given 
152. Clarkson v. Skidmore, 4 N.Y. 297, 297 (N.Y. 1871).  Accord Standard Livestock Co. v. 
Bank of Cal., Nat’l Ass’n, 227 P. 962, 968 (Ill. App. Ct. 1924); First Nat’l Bank v. Briggs, 22 Ill. App. 
228, 231 (Ill. App. Ct. 1886) (“[P]arties who had estates, interests or liens in the land which were 
subordinate to the sale are entitled to be paid out of this surplus the equivalent of their respective 
interests, estates and liens, in the order of their priority.”); Mich. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Sheridon, 11 
Ohio App. 29, 32 (Ohio Ct. App. 1918).  The same distributional rule applies to other interests in the 
property foreclosed upon, such as an easement.  Winthrop v. Welling, 2 A.D. 229, 233 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1896).
153. HAROLD G. ARON, THE GIST OF REAL PROPERTY LAW 156 (Writers Publishing Company 
1916).
154. 1 CHARLES HASTINGS WILTSIE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF FORECLOSING
MORTGAGES ON REAL PROPERTY: AND OF REMEDIES COLLATERAL THERETO, WITH FORMS 264 (rev. 
Henry Clifford Spur & Hiram Morris Rogers, Williamson Law Book Co.  1913), (citing Clarkson v. 
Skidmore, 46 N.Y. 297 (N.Y. 1871)).
155. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979). See also Nobleman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 
U.S. 324, 329 (1993). 
156. See 11 U.S.C. §365(h) (2012). 
157. Id.
158. 11 U.S.C. §§ 361, 363(e), (f) (2012). 
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to each entity in the amount by which the termination of the interest by the free 
and clear sale “results in a decrease in the value of such entity’s interest in such 
property.”159  The interest of a tenant under a first priority lease is the value of 
its position, i.e., its leasehold or the first proceeds from the sale.160  By contrast, 
the holder of a subordinate, out-of-the-money interest is entitled to nothing as 
adequate protection, because the value of the holder’s interest in the property 
being sold was zero both before and after the sale, the same outcome as in a 
state law foreclosure proceeding. 
An identifiable federal interest also is missing.  Neither the Bankruptcy 
Code nor case law has articulated a federal interest that generally protects or 
elevates the rights of tenants over the state law rights of the holders of mort-
gages and other liens who have priority over the lease, or against other creditors 
whose distributions would be diminished by grafting section 365(h) onto sec-
tion 363(f) in derogation of state law. 
Federal interests in bankruptcy proceedings are, instead, the maximization 
of the value of the debtor’s estate and payments to the debtor’s creditors, equal-
ity in the distribution of estate assets, and the efficient resolution of the debtor’s 
estate and financial affairs.161  Preserving possession by a tenant under a subor-
dinate lease on a free and clear sale of the property undermines all of these 
federal interests. 
Straining to read the lease rejection provision in section 365(h) to protect 
an out-of-the-money subordinate lease on a free and clear sale under section 
363(f) is nothing less than alchemy: it transforms a subordinate lease under state 
law into a first, superpriority encumbrance against the property under bank-
ruptcy law.  Such a radical departure from state law and the parties’ bargained-
for, prepetition rights might be justified if it furthered federal interests.  But the 
divergence championed by the district courts in Revel and Precision accom-
plishes the opposite result, upsetting the equitable distribution that otherwise 
would have been made with respect to the encumbrances that were bargained-
159. 11 U.S.C. §§ 361(1), 363(e).  Section 361(1) states that, on a sale, adequate protection can 
be provided by payment.  Section 361(2) states that, on a sale, adequate protection also may be pro-
vided by granting a lien or replacement lien, though this latter alternative is rarely utilized, and in any 
event would not change the state law priorities. 11 U.S.C. § 361(2). 
160. One ground for a sale free and clear of an interest under section 363(f) is the consent of the 
holder of the interest.  11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(2).  The stronger argument is that, if the tenant under a first 
priority lease does not consent, then the sale should be subject to the lease. See discussion infra Part 
VIII.C.2.  If the tenant does consent, though, it is entitled to the first proceeds of sale, prior to payment 
to the holders of any other liens, encumbrances, or other interests in the property. 
161. See e.g., Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, 554 U.S. 33, 35 (2008); Cent. Va. 
Cmmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 363–64 (2006); Bank of Am. v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 
U.S. 434, 453 (1999); Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 163 (1991). 
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for prepetition under state law, by transferring value from the holders of prior 
liens and encumbrances to the tenant under a subordinate, out-of-the-money 
lease.
The reading by which section 365(h) trumps section 363(f) undermines still 
another federal interest.  The resolution of the debtor’s estate and financial af-
fairs becomes woefully inefficient with respect to any property of the debtor 
that is subject to a mortgage or other lien having priority over a lease.  In such 
a case, the first mortgagee can be expected to seek relief from the automatic 
stay in the bankruptcy case, in order to foreclose in state court and thus, obtain 
the treatment afforded to its first priority mortgage under state law.162  The 
“[u]niform treatment of property interests by both state and federal courts 
within a State”—that “serves to reduce uncertainty, to discourage forum shop-
ping, and to prevent a party from receiving ‘a windfall merely by reason of the 
happenstance of bankruptcy’”—is thus lost.163
State law determines the rights of the owners and holders of encumbrances 
against real property in a bankruptcy case, absent a congressional command or 
other identifiable federal interest that alters state law.  Congress has issued no 
such command nor is there an identifiable federal interest that would alter the 
state law rights of mortgagees, tenants, or other persons holding interests in or 
against real property on a free and clear sale under section 363(f).  Interpreting 
section 365(h) to preserve a subordinate lease on a section 363(f) free and clear 
sale turns bargained-for, prepetition state law property rights on their head and 
undermines the efficiency and predictability of bankruptcy as a collective debt-
collection device, in contradiction of Butner and Noblemen.
VII. THE AUTHORITY TO SELL FREE AND CLEAR OF LIENS AND OTHER
INTERESTS INCLUDING A SUBORDINATE LEASE UNDER PRE-CODE
BANKRUPTCY ACTS AND CASE LAW
The Supreme Court consistently has held that it “will not read the Bank-
ruptcy Code to erode past bankruptcy practice absent a clear indication that 
Congress intended such a departure.”164  Pre-Code bankruptcy case law and 
practice that is “sufficiently widespread and well recognized” justifies “the con-
clusion of implicit adoption by the Code” because it is “the type of ‘rule’ that . . . 
162. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (2012). 
163. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) (quoting Lewis v. Mfrs. Nat’l Bank, 364 
U.S. 603, 609 (1961)).
164. Hamilton v. Lanning, 560 U.S. 505, 517 (2010) (citations omitted). 
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Congress was aware of when enacting the Code.”165  This interpretive presump-
tion applies and “informs” the Court’s “understanding of the language of the 
Code,” where the text is not clear but is “subject to interpretation” or ambigu-
ous.166  I consider in Part VII the pre-Code law and practice of sales free and 
clear of liens and other encumbrances including leases.  Part VIII analyzes the 
text of the 1978 Code to determine whether Congress clearly indicated a depar-
ture from this pre-Code law and practice, as well as the purposes and legislative 
history of the Code. 
Supreme Court precedents extending back to the 1840s unequivocally au-
thorized courts sitting in bankruptcy to order the sale of estate property free and 
clear of liens and other encumbrances as though in a hypothetical foreclosure 
proceeding.167  The courts established this doctrine under each of the Bank-
ruptcy Acts of 1841, 1867, and 1898, notwithstanding the absence of any ex-
press statutory authority in those enactments.168  These precedents support both 
the power to sell free and clear of a subordinate lease, and the corollary right of 
a tenant whose lease has priority to remain in possession.  Nothing in sections 
363(f) or 365(h) of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code indicates that Congress made 
any change to this practice.169
The Supreme Court first established the free and clear sale doctrine under 
the Bankruptcy Act of 1841 in Ex Parte Christy, describing the power as a ju-
dicially-created foreclosure sale conducted for the purpose of reducing estate 
assets to cash for distribution to creditors.170  Courts sitting in bankruptcy, the 
court held, have the power “to redeem or foreclose, or to enforce, or to set aside 
such a lien, mortgage, or other security.”171  The practice continued without 
165. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 10 (2000) (first 
quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 246 (1989); then citing Dewsnup v. Timm,
502 U.S. 410, 418 (1992) (relying on “clearly established” pre-Code practice); and then citing Kelly 
v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 46 (1986) (giving weight to pre-Code practice that was “widely accepted” 
and “established”)). 
166. Id. at 10–11 (first quoting Kelly, 479 U.S. at 50; then quoting Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 417; 
and then quoting BFP v. Resolution Tr. Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 546 (1994)); United States v. Noland, 
517 U.S. 535, 539 (1996) (looking to pre-Code practice in interpreting Code’s reference to “principles 
of equitable subordination”); Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494, 501 
(1986) (codification of trustee’s abandonment power held to incorporate established exceptions). 
167. Ex Parte Christy, 44 U.S. 292 (1845). 
168. See id. See also Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440 (1841), repealed by Act of 
March 3, 1843, ch. 82, 5 Stat. 614 (1843); Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517 (1867), 
repealed by Act of June 7, 1878, ch. 160, 20 Stat. 99 (1878); Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 
544 (1898). 
169. 11 U.S.C. §§ 363(f), 365(h) (1978). 
170. Ex Parte Christy, 44 U.S. at 312 (1845). 
171. Id. at 316–17. 
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interruption under the Bankruptcy Acts of 1867 and 1898.172
Under this free and clear sale doctrine, the trustee, referee, or assignee sold 
the property in the bankruptcy free and clear of liens and other encumbrances, 
and satisfied those liens and other encumbrances from the sale proceeds in ac-
cordance with their respective priorities.173  These precedents authorized the 
district courts sitting in bankruptcy to order the sale of the property free and 
clear by a “hypothetical” foreclosure proceeding, rather than by a proceeding 
that was actually and presently available to the trustee, referee, or assignee, and 
to compel the holders of interests that were subordinate to monetary liens 
against the property to accept a money satisfaction.174
A. Free and Clear Sale Cases under the Bankruptcy Act of 1841 
The Supreme Court established the power in a bankruptcy case to sell estate 
property free and clear of liens and other interests in Ex Parte Christy under the 
Bankruptcy Act of 1841.175  The authority cannot be found in any express pro-
vision the 1841 Act.176  Instead, the Court in Christy shaped the courts’ author-
ity from the equity jurisdiction granted by the Act, and from the powers given 
to the districts courts under the Act to sell the debtor’s property, to satisfy the 
interests against the property, and to distribute the sale proceeds.177
Justice Story, writing for the majority in Christy, reasoned that the purpose 
of the 1841 Act “was to secure a prompt and effectual administration and set-
tlement of the estate of all bankrupts within a limited period.”178  For this pur-
pose “it was indispensable that an entire system adequate to that end should be 
provided by Congress, capable of being worked out through the instrumentality 
172. See discussion infra Parts VI.B, VI.C..  See also Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 
517 (1867), repealed by Act of June 7, 1878, ch. 160, 20 Stat. 99 (1878); Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 
541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898). 
173. See discussion infra Parts VI.B, VI.C. 
174. See discussion infra Parts VI.B, VI.C. 
175. Ex Parte Christy, 44 U.S. at 312; Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440 (1841), repealed
by Act of March 3, 1843, ch. 82, 5 Stat. 614 (1843).  The Bankruptcy Act of 1841 was enacted in the 
midst of the economic depression that followed the Panic of 1837, the deepest U.S. downturn prior to 
the Great Depression of the 1930s. 
176. See generally Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440 (1841), repealed by Act of March 
3, 1843, ch. 82, 5 Stat. 614 (1843).
177. Ex Parte Christy, 44 U.S. at 311–12 (1845).  The court also noted that, but for the jurisdic-
tion given by the 1841 Act, “the District Courts of the United States possess no equity jurisdiction 
whatsoever.” Id.
178. Id. at 312. 
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of its own courts, independently of all aid and assistance from any other tribu-
nals over which it could exercise no effectual control.”179  Thus, the essential 
powers and duties of a court in a bankruptcy case included authority to promptly 
liquidate and distribute the estate’s assets “to ensure a speedy settlement and 
close” of a bankruptcy case, to “to sell, manage, and dispose of the estate and 
property of the bankrupt,” and “to redeem and discharge any mortgage.”180
Justice Story emphasized the broad sweep of jurisdiction and authority 
given by Congress to the district courts under section 6 of the 1841 Act, which 
extended “to all acts, matters, and things, to be done under and in virtue of the 
bankruptcy until the final distribution and settlement of the estate of the bank-
rupt, and the close of the proceedings in bankruptcy.”181  Further, “[s]ound pol-
icy . . . dictated to Congress the propriety of vesting in the District Court full 
and complete jurisdiction over all cases arising, or acts done, or matters in-
volved, in the due administration and final settlement of the bankrupt’s es-
tate.”182  A court sitting in bankruptcy thus had “jurisdiction over liens and 
mortgages existing upon the property of a bankrupt, so as to inquire into their 
validity and extent, and grant the same relief which the state courts might or 
ought to grant,”183 and the authority “to redeem or foreclose, or to enforce, or 
to set aside such a lien, mortgage, or other security.”184
The Supreme Court’s view on the subject of sales free and clear was clari-
fied in Nugent v. Boyd185, decided in the same year and term as Christy.186  In 
Nugent as in Christy property was sold in a state court foreclosure proceeding 
while the bankruptcy case was pending.187  Chief Justice Taney writing for the 
Court stated: “I wish it . . . to be distinctly understood, that I am fully of opinion 
that the District Court of the United States is vested with jurisdiction over mort-
gaged property belonging to the bankrupt, and that when a proper case is shown, 
it has power to foreclose a mortgage, and to do all other acts necessary to bring 
about a final distribution and settlement of the bankrupt estate.”188
The Court put the issue to rest yet again in Houston v. City Bank of New 
179. Id.
180. Id. at 312–13. 
181. Id. at 313. 
182. Id. at 321. 
183. Id. at 292. 
184. Id. at 316–17. 
185. See Nugent v. Boyd, 44 U.S. 426, 436 (1845). 
186. See Ex Parte Christy, 44 U.S. 292 (1845). 
187. Nugent, 44 U.S. at 434–35. 
188. Id. at 437. 
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Orleans in 1848.189  The debtor had been declared a bankrupt under the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1841.190  The district court in the bankruptcy case ordered his 
“mortgaged premises to be sold, and directed that the mortgages should be can-
celled, and the property sold free from encumbrance, rendering to the parties 
interested their respective priorities in the proceeds.”191  The sale transaction 
closed.192
Subsequently, the City Bank of New Orleans, which held a third mortgage 
against the property, brought an action in state court seeking to enforce its mort-
gage.193  The case worked its way to the Louisiana Supreme Court, which “ad-
judged that the property should be seized by the sheriff, and sold to satisfy the 
demand of the bank.”194  The Louisiana judgment was brought before the U.S. 
Supreme Court for revision in Houston v. City Bank of New Orleans.195
Chief Justice Taney framed the question before the court as “simply this: 
Are the purchasers under the sale . . . entitled to hold the property free and 
discharged from the mortgage and encumbrance of the City Bank?”196  Taney, 
with apparent impatience, answered “yes.”197  The power of the federal court 
over mortgages in cases of bankruptcy, he reiterated, had been fully argued and 
considered in Christy and Nugent.198  The Court was “unanimously of opinion” 
that the assignee’s sale of the property was valid, and that “the purchasers 
[were] entitled to hold it free and discharged from the mortgage to the City 
Bank, and from all other encumbrances mentioned in the proceedings.”199
B. Free and Clear Sale Cases under the Bankruptcy Act of 1867 
The Bankruptcy Act of 1867 became law fourteen years after the repeal in 
1843 of the 1841 Act.  The 1867 Act similarly contained no express provision 
that gave the district court or an assignee of the debtor’s assets in a bankruptcy 
case the authority to sell estate property free and clear of liens and other inter-
ests.200
189. Houston v. City Bank of New Orleans, 47 U.S. 486, 506 (1848). 
190. Id. at 504 . 
191. Id.
192. Id. at 504–05. 
193. Id. at 505. 
194. Id. at 506. 
195. Id. at 505–06. 




200. Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517 (1867), repealed by Act of June 7, 1878, ch. 
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Yet the district courts consistently ordered sales of estate property free and 
clear of encumbrances under the 1867 Act.201  And in 1874 the Supreme Court 
in Ray v. Norseworthy held that the power to sell free and clear under the 1867 
Act was “necessarily involved in the due administration and settlement of the 
bankrupt’s estate.”202  It had been “conferred upon the bankrupt courts by the 
former Bankrupt Act” of 1841, “because they were matters arising under the 
act and were necessarily involved in the due administration and settlement of 
the bankrupt’s estate.”203  The court, citing Ex Parte Christy, held that a district 
court sitting in bankruptcy could order the sale of property “free from incum-
brances, rendering to the parties interested their respective priorities in the pro-
ceeds.”204
C. Free and Clear Sale Cases under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 
1. Pre-Chandler Act Cases 
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, yet again, contained no express provision for 
the free and clear sale of estate property.205  Yet the district courts and the circuit 
courts, again, consistently determined that courts sitting in bankruptcy had such 
jurisdiction and authority.206
The Supreme Court finally considered the issue in 1931, in Van Huffel v. 
160, 20 Stat. 99 (1878); Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440 (1841), repealed by Act of March 
3, 1843, ch. 82, 5 Stat. 614 (1843). 
201. In re Barrow, 2 F. Cas. 941, 942 (D. La. 1868); In re Kahley, 14 F. Cas. 71, 73 (W.D. Wis. 
1870) (first citing Houston v. City Bank of New Orleans, 47 U.S. 486 (1848); and then citing Ex Parte 
Christy, 44 U.S. 292 (1845)); In re Kingon, 14 F. Cas. 579, 580 (S.D.N.Y. 1870); Davis v. Anderson, 
7 F. Cas. 103, 108 (E.D. Mo. 1872); Whitman v. Butler, 29 F. Cas. 1063, 1065 (D.R.I. 1873); In re 
Brinkman, 4 F. Cas. 145, 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1884) (“The court has power, on the application of the as-
signee or trustee, to order the sale of encumbered property, free from encumbrances, transferring the 
liens from the property to the fund realized from its sale.”). See also, Foster v. Ames, 9 F. Cas. 527, 
529 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869). 
202. Ray v. Norseworthy, 90 U.S. 128, 134 (1874). 
203. Id.
204. Id. (citing Ex Parte Christy, 44 U.S. at 313 (1845)). Accord Factors’ & Traders’ Ins. Co. v. 
Murphy, 111 U.S. 738, 739 (1884). 
205. See generally Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898). 
206. In re Union Tr. Co., 122 F. 937, 938 (1st Cir. 1903); In re E.A. Kinsey Co., 184 F. 694, 696 
(6th Cir. 1911); In re Roger Brown & Co., 196 F. 758, 761 (8th Cir. 1912); In re Franklin Brewing 
Co., 249 F. 333, 335 (2d Cir. 1918) (citing In re Haywood Wagon Co., 219 F. 655, 662–63 (2d Cir. 
1914); In re Kohl-Hepp Brick Co., 176 F. 340, 343 (2d Cir. 1910)); Gantt v. Jones, 272 F. 117, 118 
(4th Cir. 1921); In re Gimbel, 294 F. 883, 885 (5th Cir. 1923); Broadway Tr. Co. v. Dill, 17 F.2d 486, 
486 (3d Cir. 1927). See also Smith v. McKenna Brass Mfg. Co., 98 F.2d 537, 538 (3d Cir. 1938); In
re Pittelkow, 92 F. 901, 904 (E.D. Wis. 1899); S. Loan & Tr. Co. v. Benbow, 96 F. 514, 521 (W.D.N.C. 
1899); In re Sanborn, 96 F. 551, 552 (D. Vt. 1899); In re Barber, 97 F. 547, 552 (D. Minn. 1899); In
re Goldsmith, 118 F. 763, 767 (N.D. Tex. 1902); In re Keet, 128 F. 651, 651 (M.D. Pa. 1903). 
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Harkelrode.207  Justice Brandeis, writing for a unanimous court, stated that un-
der the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 the power to sell free and clear of encumbrances 
against the property was “granted by implication.”208  The court reasoned that 
“[l]ike power had long been exercised by federal courts sitting in equity when 
ordering sales by receivers or on foreclosure,”209 and “must be implied from the 
general equity powers of the court and the duty imposed by § 2 of the Bank-
ruptcy [1898] Act to collect, reduce to money and distribute the estates of bank-
rupts, and to determine controversies with relation thereto.”210  The issue of a 
subordinate out-of-the-money lease was considered by the Second Circuit in In
re Hotel Governor Clinton, Inc., decided months prior to the effective date of 
the Chandler Act amendments in 1938.211  The court acknowledged that the 
state law priorities of prepetition encumbrances, including leases, continued in 
bankruptcy.212  A “lease creates an estate in the land but this is subject to prior 
mortgages and encumbrances.”213  “If a second mortgage or subsequent encum-
brance behind a first mortgage could be wiped out in reorganization, then a 
lease could be.”214  Accordingly, it was within the court’s power to terminate 
the lease in conjunction with the bankrupt’s plan of reorganization.215  The court 
207. Van Huffel v. Harkelrode, 284 U.S. 225, 227 (1931). 
208. Id.
209. Id. at 227 (citing inter alia First Nat’l Bank of Cleveland v. Shedd, 121 U.S. 74, 87 (1887) 
(foreclosure sale); Mellen v. Moline Malleable Iron Works, 131 U.S. 352, 367 (1889) (sale by re-
ceiver); Seaboard Nat’l Bank v. Rogers Milk Prods. Co., 21 F.2d 414, 416 (2d Cir. 1927) (sale by 
receiver); Murray Rubber Co. v. Wood, 11 F.2d 528 (3d Cir. 1926); Broadway Tr. Co. v. Dill, 17 F.2d 
486, 486 (3d Cir. 1927) (sale by receiver); City of New Orleans v. Peake, 52 F. 74, 75 (5th Cir. 1892) 
(sales by receiver); and Mercantile Tr. Co. v. Tenn. Cent. R.R. Co., 294 F. 483, 484 (6th Cir. 1923) 
(foreclosure sale)). See also Hoehn v. McIntosh, 110 F.2d 199, 202 (6th Cir. 1940) (“The uniform rule 
prevails that a court of bankruptcy, under the general equity powers conferred on it by the Bankruptcy 
Act, has authority to order a sale of the bankrupt’s property, free from all liens and encumbrances.” 
(citing Van Huffel v. Harkelrode, 284 U.S. 225 (1931))).  Curiously, the Court in Van Huffel v. Harkel-
rode stated that the 1898 Act, “unlike the Act of 1867, contain[ed] no provision which in terms con-
fer[red] upon bankruptcy courts the power to sell property of the bankrupt free from incumbrances.”  
Van Huffel, 284 U.S. at 228.  This appears to be an inaccurate construction of the 1867 Act, which also 
contained no express grant of such authority. 
210. Van Huffel, 284 U.S. at 228 (citing inter alia In re Pittelkow, 92 F. 901, 902 (E.D. Wis. 
1899); S. Loan & Tr. Co. v. Benbow, 96 F. 514, 527 (W.D.N.C. 1899)). 
211. In re Hotel Governor Clinton, 96 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1938), cert. denied. 305 U.S. 613 (1938).  
The case was decided prior to the effective date of the Chandler Act. 
212. Id. at 51. 
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drew the “obvious distinction between depriving a lienor of the right to fore-
close a security without giving him equivalent value,”216 and “refusing him 
foreclosure where his lien is concededly worthless.”217  The court concluded 
that the lien of the lease arose “to no greater dignity than a second mortgage on 
the premises,” and held that the district court’s order directing the transfer free 
of the lease was proper.218
2. Post-Chandler Act Cases 
A trustee’s power to either assume or reject a lease was expressly estab-
lished by Congress in 1938 in section 70b of the Chandler Act.219  The tenant’s 
possessory rights were preserved on rejection, much as they are by the current 
section 365(h), by the Act’s providing that a rejection did not “deprive the les-
see of his estate” unless the lease expressly provided to the contrary.220  Section 
70b—like its replacement section 365(h)—made no reference to what might 
occur on a free and clear sale.221
An early case applying the new section 70b in the context of a sale was In
re Freeman.222  One of the debtors in Freeman owned a small house and a lot 
that were subject to both a mortgage and a lease, with a remaining term of less 
than two years.223  The debtor rejected the lease.224  The court held that the 
tenant’s “estate” preserved by section 70b was nothing more than a tenancy at 
will, terminable under state law on two months’ notice, which had been 
given.225  The court did not order payment to the tenant of the value of its lost 
leasehold estate from the sale proceeds after payment of the first mortgage, in 
contradiction of the position advocated by this Article.226  The Freeman deci-
sion was criticized by the Fifth Circuit thirty-five years later in Matter of Gar-
finkle, not for ordering the sale free and clear, but for ruling that a post-rejection 
“estate” under section 70b was a tenancy at sufferance.227
216. Id. at 52 (citing Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 601–02 (1935)). 
217. Id. (citing In re Witherbee Court Corp., 88 F.2d 251, 253 (2d Cir. 1937)). 
218. Id. at 52. 
219. Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 70b, 52 Stat. 840 (1938). 
220. Id.
221. Compare Chandler Act § 70b, with 11 U.S.C. § 365(h) (2012). 
222. In re Freeman, 49 F.Supp. 163, 164 (S.D. Ga. 1943). 
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 164–65 n.4. 
226. Id. at 168. 
227. Commercial Trading Co. v. Lansburgh (Matter of Garfinkle), 577 F.2d 901, 904 n.4 (5th 
Cir. 1978). 
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The district court in Matter of New York Investors Mutual Group, Inc., by 
comparison, characterized the tenant’s possessory estate as a lien while recog-
nizing nonetheless the court’s power to authorize a sale free and clear.228  The 
bankrupt, New York Investors Mutual Group, Inc., acquired the fee estate in 
1954, subject to a mortgage.229  At the time of the bankruptcy filing in 1956, 
East Netherland Holding Co. was the tenant in possession under a 1914 ground 
lease that had been renewed for an additional twenty-one-year term in 1935.230
The 1914 lease and a 1953 assignment of the lease to East Netherland Holding 
Co. were recorded prior to the bankruptcy case.231  The 1935 extension was not 
recorded until 1956, after the bankruptcy case was filed.232
The lease required the landlord, at the end of the current term, to either 
renew for a “further term of 21 years or to pay to the lessee the value of the 
buildings” that had been constructed on the leased premises, failing which the 
tenant could not be compelled to surrender possession.233  The trustee sought to 
reject the lease and sell the property free and clear without paying for the build-
ings.234  The referee ruled that East Netherland was entitled to remain in pos-
session until payment was made, and that it had a lien on the real property for 
the payment of the value of the buildings.235  The district court confirmed the 
report of the referee, holding that the continuation of the tenant’s possessory 
rights until payment was made was part of the tenant’s “estate” that could not 
be destroyed by rejection.236
But the district court, citing the free and clear sale authority of Van Huffel 
v. Harkelrode,237 entered its judgment “without prejudice to a further applica-
tion by the trustee for leave to sell the premises free of any lien for the value 
which may be determined for the buildings and free of any right of possession 
in favor of the tenant upon condition that an appropriate provision is contained 
in the order which shall fully protect the tenant so as to provide for the actual 
payment of the valuation.”238
228. Matter of N.Y. Inv’rs Mut. Grp., 153 F.Supp. 772, 775 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). 
229. Id. at 774. 
230. Id. at 773–74. 
231. Id. at 774. 
232. Id. at 774, 776. 
233. Id. at 773. 
234. Id.
235. Id. at 773–74. 
236. Id. at 774–75. 
237. Id. at 777 n.14. 
238. Id. at 777.  Though the opinion indicates that there also was a mortgage against the property, 
it does state whether the mortgage was subordinate or prior to the lease. 
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The trustee appealed.239  The Second Circuit in Cohen v. East Netherland 
Holding Co. stated the main question to be “whether a lien on real property 
owned by the bankrupt,” created by the unrecorded 1935 lease, “was so far 
perfected prior to the bankruptcy that it could not be deemed a voidable prefer-
ence under § 60 of the Bankrupty Act.”240  The court held that it was so “per-
fected” by the tenant’s continued possession of the leased premises from 1935, 
and affirmed.241  The court took no issue with the district court’s proviso that 
the trustee nonetheless could sell free and clear of the lease.242
The district court in Matter of Penn Central Transportation Company
reached a similar conclusion, in what was then the largest bankruptcy case in 
U.S. history.243  Penn Central’s proposed “disaffirmance” under its reorganiza-
tion plans of some thirty-seven ground leases and other leases, in anticipation 
of its selling the underlying properties, “met strenuous opposition from the les-
sees.”244
Some of the ground leases were for lengthy initial periods.245  The lessees 
under those leases had constructed large office buildings on their leaseholds, 
financed through leasehold mortgages “aggregating very substantial amounts” 
that were held by various insurance companies and the New York State pension 
fund.246
The ground lease rentals were below market.247  The trustees’ purpose in 
rejecting the ground leases was to increase the rentals to the present fair market 
level, thus dramatically increasing the value of the trustees’ interest in the prop-
erties.248  The trustee planned to sell the properties in the bankruptcy proceed-
ing.249  The net effect of approving the trustees’ proposal thus would be to “quite 
substantially” increase the proceeds that would be paid to the estate on the bank-
ruptcy sale of the properties.250
239. Cohen v. E. Netherland Holding Co., 258 F.2d 14, 15 (2d Cir. 1958). 
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 15, 17. 
243. See generally Wikipedia, Penn Central Transportation Company, https://en.wikipe-
dia.org/wiki/Penn_Central_Transportation_Company [https://perma.cc/47YB-HCVG]; Matter of 
Penn Cent. Trans. Co., 458 F.Supp. 1346 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
244. Matter of Penn Cent. Trans. Co., 458 F. Supp. at 1349–50, 1353. 
245. Id. at 1353. 
246. Id. at 1353–54. 
247. Id. at 1353. 
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 1354. 
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The case presented two issues that had “long occasioned debate among 
bankruptcy experts—(1) What is the ‘estate’ of which the lessee may not be 
deprived;” and (2) Did section 70b apply in reorganization proceedings?251  The 
court held that, even in a liquidation proceeding, to which section 70b was 
“clearly applicable,” the bar against depriving a lessee of his estate could not 
“reasonably be interpreted as an absolute bar against all interference with the 
lessee’s rights in the event of the lessor’s bankruptcy.  If that were the congres-
sional intent, the language would no doubt have limited the power of rejection 
of leases to those instances in which the bankrupt [was] the lessee.”252
The key issue for the district court was whether the leasehold estates were 
subordinate or prior to the mortgages against the properties.253  In a “straight 
liquidation proceeding, for example, if the lease is subordinate to a mortgage, 
and the property burdened by the lease is worth less than the amount due on the 
mortgage, the leasehold is undoubtedly vulnerable,” notwithstanding the pro-
tection on rejection of section 70b.254  In such a case, the “absolute priority rule 
would be violated if the lessee’s rights remained untouched, while the rights of 
a senior mortgagee secured by the leased property were adversely affected in 
various ways.”255
Because all of the mortgages against the fee estates had been subordinated 
to the mid-Manhattan ground leases, no conflict with these priorities arose.256
There was therefore “no compelling reason for failing to apply the strictures of 
§ 70(b).”257  That the leases were below market did not change the court’s anal-
ysis, since they had lien priority over the mortgages.258  The court denied the 
trustees’ proposed disaffirmance of the leases.259
The district court in Matter of Outrigger Club, Inc. applied the same anal-




254. Id. at 1355–56. 




259. Id.  Non-sale cases emphasizing that the tenant’s “estate” under section 70(b) survived a 
rejection include: Matter of Garfinkle, 577 F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1978) (citing with approval In re N.Y. 
Inv’rs Mut. Grp., 153 F.Supp. 772 (S.D.N.Y.1957), aff’d sub. nom., Cohen v. E. Netherland Holding 
Co., 258 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1958)); Matter of Minges, 602 F.2d 38, 41–42 (2d Cir. 1979).  This interpre-
tation of section 70b was not construed to reorder the bargained-for state law priority of the lease in 
relation to the other liens against and interests in the property on a free and clear sale, as set forth 
above.
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Code and section 365(h).260  The rejection of the lease was made pursuant to a 
plan.261  The court dismissively noted that a subordinate lease “may be rejected 
and the lessee may be deprived of possession not because of the rejection of an 
executory contract but ‘because of the superior rights of the mortgagee,’ where 
the lease is subordinate to the mortgage.”262  The thirty-year lease at issue was 
executed after the debtor’s mortgage to the bank and the mortgage expressly 
provided that subsequent leases of more than five years were subordinate to the 
mortgage.263  The lease accordingly was expressly subordinated.264  The bank 
was undersecured.265  Citing the Second Circuit’s Hotel Governor Clinton with 
approval, the Florida district court in Outrigger stated that the “essence of Gov-
ernor Clinton is that a lease, junior to an undersecured mortgage and therefore 
valueless, can be eliminated in bankruptcy just as it could in foreclosure.”266
The court rejected the tenant’s argument that a lease provision barring termina-
tion of the lease on foreclosure protected it from ejectment because the holder 
of the mortgage to which the lease was subordinate had not agreed to such pro-
vision.267  The court found that the rejection of the lease pursuant to the plan 
resulted in its termination and ordered the tenant to “vacate the premises forth-
with.”268
As shown in this Part, pre-Code bankruptcy law and practice consistently 
characterized a free and clear sale of the debtor’s real property as the equivalent 
of a state law foreclosure sale, under all three Bankruptcy Acts that preceded 
the Code, from Ex Parte Christy and Nugent v. Boyd under the 1841 Act, 
through to Ray v. Norseworthy under the 1867 Act and Van Huffel under the 
1898 Act.  The treatment of a lease on such a sale was in accordance with the 
priority of its encumbrance against the property.  That priority was established 
by the parties’ bargained-for, prepetition state law rights, and this pre-Code law 
and practice vindicated those rights in the bankruptcy proceeding as required 
by Butner and Nobleman.





265. Id. at 153–54 (citing 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 603–604, ¶3.24(1.1) (14th ed. 1978)); In
re Hotel Governor Clinton, 96 F.2d 502 (2d Cir. 1938) cert. denied. 305 U.S. 613 (1938)). 
266. Matter of Outrigger Club, 9 B.R. 152, 153 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981). 
267. Id. at 154. 
268. Id.
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VIII. SALES FREE AND CLEAR OF A LEASE AND THE TENANT’S POSSESSORY
RIGHTS ON CONSIDERATION OF THE TEXT, PURPOSES AND LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
The Supreme Court “will not read the Bankruptcy Code to erode past bank-
ruptcy practice absent a clear indication that Congress intended such a depar-
ture.”269  This doctrine does not compel slavish adherence to pre-Code law and 
practice.  Rather it proceeds from the reasoning that Congress has the power to 
alter the law.  The absence of a clear indication from Congress in the text that 
it was changing well-established law, especially when reenacting a comprehen-
sive statute such as the bankruptcy law, indicates a congressional acceptance of 
the continuing efficacy of settled law.  By comparison, if the text of the reen-
acted statute is clear or if the pre-Code practice was insufficiently established, 
then such presumption is unwarranted.270
Has Congress clearly indicated that it intended to depart from or “erode 
prior bankruptcy practice” on a free and clear sale with respect to leases, liens, 
and other encumbrances?  Does the text of the 1978 Code as subsequently 
amended elevate a lease that is subordinate to a monetary lien under state law 
to the status of a first priority encumbrance against the property that the debtor 
seeks to sell? 
A. Textualism, Purposivism, and Pluralistic Interpretive Regimes 
A close consideration of the text is required to answer these questions and 
reconcile sections 365(h) with 363(f).  That textual analysis is informed by a 
brief account of a loudly proclaimed and ongoing conflict between interpreta-
tive modes.  This battle between textualism and purposivism was waged with 
269. Hamilton v. Lanning, 560 U.S. 505, 517 (2010) (quoting Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. 
v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 549 U.S. 443, 454 (2007) (citations omitted)). 
270. Compare discussion supra Part VI (the unbroken 100-plus year pre-Code practice and law 
under Supreme Court precedent for sales free and clear under each Bankruptcy Act, that treated a 
bankruptcy sale free and clear as a state law foreclosure sale, with payment to holders of liens, leases, 
and other encumbrances, in order of priority), with United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 
237, 246, 251 (1989) (deciding the issue of whether postpetition interest is payable on oversecured, 
nonconsensual claims, e.g., tax claims, under Code section 506, in which Blackmun for a 5–4 majority 
concluded that the text was clear and that pre-Code practice not sufficiently established and “certainly 
not the type of ‘rule’ that we assume Congress was aware of when enacting the code; nor was it of 
such significance the Congress would have taken steps other than enacting statutory language to the 
contrary.”  Justice O’Connor, in a dissent joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, deter-
mined that the text was not clear, the pre-Code practice was sufficiently established, and “Midlantic
counsels against inferring congressional intent to change pre-Code bankruptcy law.”). 
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great vigor in the last decades of the 20th and the first years of the 21st centu-
ries.271
The late Justice Antonin Scalia and Garner have written: “Textualism, in its 
purest form, begins and ends with what the text says and fairly implies.  Its 
principal tenets have guided the interpretation of legal texts for centuries.”272
Justice Scalia and Garner and other textualists decry nontextualism and pur-
posivism in particular, which in their view “frees the judge from interpretive 
scruple.”273  “So-called purposivism,” they contend, “facilitates departure from 
the text in several ways.  Where purpose is king, text is not—so the purposivist 
goes around or behind the words of the controlling text to achieve what he be-
lieves to be the provision’s purpose.”274  “The purposivist, who derives the 
meaning of text from purpose and not purpose from the meaning of text, is free 
to climb up this ladder of purposes” and, ultimately, “disregard text.”275
Hart and Sachs, arguably the leading purposivists against whom the textu-
alists have railed, would first: 
1.  Decide what purpose ought to be attributed to the statute 
and to any subordinate provision of it which may be involved; 
and then 2. Interpret the words of the statute immediately in 
question so as to carry out the purpose as best [one] can . . . .276
Hart and Sachs claimed that purposivism, and not textualism, has the his-
torical high ground, citing to the “time-tested but time-and-again-forgotten wis-
dom” of the 1584 Heydon’s Case under which view a statute is best interpreted 
by first considering the “mischief” sought to be remedied by the legislature in 
passing it.277
Supporters of Hart and Sachs’s approach have not been silent over the last 
271. See supra sources accompanying notes 48, 39. See also John P. Figura, Against the Creation 
Myth of Textualism: Theories of Constitutional Interpretation in the Nineteenth Century, 80 MISS. L.J.
587, 588 (2010). 
272. SCALIA AND GARNER, READING LAW, supra note 48, at 16. 
273. Id. at 18. 
274. Id.
275. Id. at 19. 
276. HART AND SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS, supra note 49, at 1374 (C). 
277. Id. at 1211, 1378 (citing Heydon’s Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (Ex. 1584)).  Insightful charac-
terizations of the basis for earlier approaches to statutory interpretation include Manning’s assertion 
that the “faithful agent theory” appears to more accurately describe the earlier judicial role.  He draws 
on the research of scholars who “maintain, in particular, that the judicial power ‘to say what the law 
is’ originally encompassed an inherent equitable power to reshape statutes without regard to legislative 
intent.”  John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7 (2001). 
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three decades.  A few examples suffice.  Posner, in a practical rebuke of as-
cendant textualism in the 1980s278 objected “to the proposition that one must 
always begin with the words,” and was “reasonably confident that more often 
than not the judge—the good judge as well as the bad judge—in fact begins 
somewhere else.”279  Eskridge and Frickey asserted in the 1990s that the 
“tougher version of textualism” takes “a dogmatic and often bizarre view of 
what is clear,” adheres to dictionaries at the expense of common sense, restrains 
the realization of definable and democratically-driven legislative goals, and “ul-
timately serves as a cover for the injection of conservative values into stat-
utes.”280  More recently Katzmann has asserted that “to jettison the inquiry” into 
what Congress intended “altogether, because of the difficulty in particular 
cases, means that judges will interpret statutes unmoored from the reality of the 
legislative process and what the legislators were seeking to do.”281  He argues, 
in support of his own use of legislative history as a Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals judge, that: “When courts construe statutes in ways that respect what 
legislators consider their work product, the judiciary not only is more likely to 
reach the correct result, but also promotes comity with the first branch of gov-
ernment.”282
Cross and others have drawn the 100-year interpretative arc as beginning 
with a primary devotion to purposivism in the early 20th century, culminating 
in the legal process school of Hart and Sacks, and shifting dramatically to tex-
tualism toward the end of the century.283  The battle continues, with no une-
quivocal resolution in sight.  Yet, putting claims to 18th and 19th century his-
toric legitimacy aside for now, the present distance between the two camps is 
not the great divide that is often described.  Comparing Justice Scalia and Gar-
ner’s approach to that of Hart and Sacks, it would appear that many of the dif-
ferences between them are more rhetorical than real, and that most are bridged 
by easy steps rather than athletic leaps.  A few examples demonstrate this. 
278. Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50
U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 808 (1983). 
279. Id.
280. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV.
L. REV. 26, 77–78 (1994). 
281. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES, supra note 49, at 35. 
282. Id. at 36. 
283. CROSS, supra note 51, at 136.  Figura has argued based on his review of legal treatises that 
purposivism is a still older interpretive school, and the 19th century was dominated “by purpose-based, 
not text-based, approaches” to interpreting both the Constitution and statutes.  John P. Figura, Against
the Creation Myth of Textualism: Theories of Constitutional Interpretation in the Nineteenth Century,
80 MISS. L.J. 587, 588 (2010). 
38800-m
qt_100-2 Sheet No. 27 Side B      02/22/2017   09:25:38
38800-mqt_100-2 Sheet No. 27 Side B      02/22/2017   09:25:38
C M
Y K
GROHSGAL-P.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/20/17 3:51 PM
340 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [100:295 
Justice Scalia and Garner, notwithstanding their emphasis on the text, ad-
vance the presumption against ineffectiveness that requires that “an interpreta-
tion that furthers the document’s purpose should be favored.”284  Hart and Sacks 
assert, notwithstanding their starting point of determining purpose, that the 
“words of the statute are what the legislature has enacted as law, and all that it 
has the power to enact.”285  Hart and Sacks, using phrases that the late Justice 
Scalia himself might proudly have penned, posit that “[u]nenacted intentions or 
wishes cannot be given effect as law. . . . Humpty Dumpty was wrong when he 
said that you can make words mean whatever you want them to mean.”286  Jus-
tice Scalia and Garner and Hart and Sacks are united in their view that the words 
of the statute cannot be given “a meaning they will not bear.”287
Under the ordinary-meaning canon of the textualist school: “Words are to 
be understood in their ordinary, everyday meanings—unless the context indi-
cates that they bear a technical sense.”288  This proposition too has its purposiv-
ist counterpart: “In various types of situations wise policy counsels against giv-
ing words an unusual meaning even though it may be linguistically 
permissible.”289  Hart and Sacks acknowledge, as do the textualists, that “dic-
tionaries are historical records (as reliable as the judgment and industry of the 
editors) of the meanings with which words have in fact been used by writers of 
good repute.  They are often useful in answering hard questions of whether, in 
an appropriate context, a particular meaning is linguistically permissible.”290
Justice Scalia and Garner eschew a mechanistic use of canons, emphasizing 
that “[n]o canon of interpretation is absolute” and “[e]ach may be overcome by 
the strength of differing principles that point in other directions.”291  Hart and 
Sacks recognize that canons are “useful as reassurances” about what meanings 
words have in particular configurations and contexts.292
Returning to the present state of the conflict, Cross suggests that a quiescent 
closure has come to pass between the opposing camps.293  Based on his statis-
tical analysis of Supreme Court decisions he concludes that Justices do not tend 
284. SCALIA AND GARNER, READING LAW, supra note 48, at 168. 
285. HART AND SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS, supra note 49, at 1375 (E). 
286. Id.
287. Id. at 1374 (C); SCALIA AND GARNER, READING LAW, supra note 48, at 3. 
288. SCALIA AND GARNER, READING LAW, supra note 48, at 69. 
289. HART AND SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS, supra note 49, at 1376 (F). 
290. Id. at 1375–76 (E). 
291. SCALIA AND GARNER, READING LAW, supra note 48, at 59. 
292. HART AND SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS, supra note 49, at 1376 (E). 
293. CROSS, supra note 51, at 154–55. 
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toward any single interpretive mode, but most often attempt to make the strong-
est case for their opinion’s outcome by citing numerous bases for the result.294
Consequently, “the justices appear to be pluralist in their statutory interpreta-
tions, frequently supporting their decisions with multiple interpretive theo-
ries.”295
B. The Supreme Court’s Pluralistic Approach to Interpreting the Bankruptcy 
Code
The Supreme Court’s construction of the Bankruptcy Code since its 1979 
effective date supports this conclusion.  The sound and fury of the seeming 
hostilities between the interpretive redoubts signify far less disagreement 
among the Justices, at least in cases construing the Bankruptcy Code, than is 
often thought.  Textual and semantic analysis, the divination of statutory pur-
poses and intent (from general principles, textual inference and legislative his-
tory), the examination of the text in light of those purposes, and consideration 
of pre-Code bankruptcy law and of past and present state law in relation to the 
current Bankruptcy Code—all and more have served Justices in their attempts 
to interpret and apply the Bankruptcy Code in a controversy before the Court. 
Examples of this general consensus on essentially pragmatic interpretive 
approaches abound in the hundred or so bankruptcy cases decided by the Su-
preme Court since the 1979 effective date of the Bankruptcy Code.  The fol-
lowing summaries of a few of the more significant cases from the 1980s through 
to the 2010s delineate the narrow width of the divide. 
In the mid-1980s, Chief Justice Rehnquist in NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco
relied on the Code’s text, statutory design, and rehabilitative purpose, as well 
as the bankruptcy courts’ equitable jurisdiction, to decide that a debtor in pos-
session could reject a collective bargaining agreement.296  Justice Brennan in 
his concurrence and dissent, joined by three Justices, did not take issue with 
Rehnquist’s interpretative approach but with the majority’s failure to reconcile 
the Bankruptcy Code with the provisions of the National Labor Relations 
Act.297
Justice Powell in Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department of 
Environmental Protection, considered the scope of a trustee’s abandonment 
294. Id.
295. Id. at 155. See also, e.g., JOHNATHAN O’NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND 
POLITICS: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 212 (2005) (“The bulk of the [Rehnquist] Court’s opinions 
cohere[d] around a pragmatic, incremental centrism, not adherence to original intent at any cost.”). 
296. NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 516 (1984). 
297. Id. at 535–54 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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power under Code section 554, which neither expressly authorizes nor ex-
pressly limits a trustee’s power to abandon property that poses a risk to public 
health or safety.298  Powell in his 5–4 opinion concluded that “[n]either the 
Court nor Congress ha[d] granted a trustee in bankruptcy powers that would 
lend support to a right to abandon property in contravention of state or local 
laws designed to protect public health or safety.”299  In so doing, he relied pri-
marily on the absence of any express provision in the Code that preempted such 
environmental law in a bankruptcy case, his view of Congress’s intent, and the 
scope of a trustee’s abandonment power under pre-Code case law.300  Chief 
Justice Rehnquist in dissent emphasized the absence of an express provision in 
the Code that made the abandonment power subject to environmental law, his 
contrary view of Congress’s intent, and the “overriding purpose of bankruptcy 
liquidation: the expeditious reduction of the debtor’s property to money, for 
equitable distribution to creditors.”301
In 1988, Justice Scalia for a unanimous Court held in United Savings Asso-
ciation of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd. that the right of 
an undersecured creditor, i.e., a secured creditor whose collateral is worth less 
than the amount of its claim, is not entitled to interest on its claim under section 
362(d)(1) as compensation for the delay caused by the automatic stay that pre-
vents it from foreclosing on the property.302  Justice Scalia reasoned that neither 
the legislative history of the Code nor pre-Code practice were adequate to over-
come the plain textual meaning of sections 362 and 506 of the Code.303
In the same year, Justice White in his unanimous decision in Norwest Bank 
Worthington v. Ahlers, determined that the new value exception to the absolute 
priority rule that might enable the debtor’s owners to keep their equity interests 
in the reorganized debtor under a cram-down plan could not be based on a con-
tribution of “sweat equity,” i.e., the debtor’s owners agreeing to provide ser-
vices to the reorganized debtor.304  In reaching this conclusion White considered 
the Code’s text and legislative history, pre-Code practice, and his view that the 
bankruptcy courts’ general equity powers must be exercised within the confines 
of the Code.305
298. Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494, 501–02 (1986). 
299. Id. at 502. 
300. Id. at 501–02. 
301. Id. at 508. 
302. United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371 
(1988).
303. Id. at 380. 
304. Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 199 (1988). 
305. Id. at 206–10.  A court’s confirmation of a chapter 11 plan requires creditor voting and 
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The following year Justice Blackmun in United States v. Ron Pair Enter-
prises, Inc. decided the “narrow statutory issue” that the IRS was entitled to 
postpetition interest on its oversecured, nonconsensual prepetition tax lien pur-
suant to section 506(b).306  He began with the text, which in his view was 
clear.307  Blackmun purported to end his inquiry there,308 yet he continued, re-
jecting the chapter 7 trustee’s reference to pre-Code practice.309  He did so first 
because he saw no ambiguity in section 506(b), and second because the practice 
of allowing interest only on oversecured consensual liens “was an exception to 
an exception, recognized by only a few courts” under pre-Code law that was 
more of a “guide” than it was a “rule” under prior law.310  In his view, it “was 
certainly not the type of ‘rule’” that the Court could assume Congress was 
aware of when enacting the Code.311  Justice O’Connor dissented, with three of 
her colleagues.312  She asserted that the text was not so clear and interpreted it 
differently.313  Further, even assuming that the text was clearer, she considered 
pre-Code law to be well established on this question and that Midlantic (dis-
cussed above) counseled against the inference of a congressional intent to 
change it.314
In the mid-1990s, Justice Scalia in BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp. held that 
a purchase of real property at a prepetition foreclosure sale was not subject to 
avoidance as a fraudulent transfer, even though the price paid was less than 
70% of what the bankruptcy court later determined was the “fair market value” 
approval.  Voting is on a class basis, and the plan designates the classes of creditors in accordance with 
the requirements of the Bankruptcy Code.  A cramdown plan is a plan that has not received the ac-
ceptance of all voting classes.  A cramdown plan may be confirmed but the court, but only if at least 
one other class of impaired claims has voted to accept the plan, and only if the plan satisfies the absolute 
priority rule.  The absolute priority rule in this application requires, among things, that the owners of 
the debtor neither receive nor retain anything under the plan “on account of” their ownership interests 
unless unsecured creditors are paid in full.  The “new value exception” to the absolute priority rule 
permits the debtor’s owners to receive the equity in the reorganized debtor if they contribute sufficient 
new value to the debtors, the essential reasoning being that debtor’s owners are buying the equity 
interests in the reorganized debtor and are not retaining or receiving the new equity on “account of” 
their old equity. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(a)(8), (10), 1129(b)(2)(B) (2012). 
306. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 237 (1989). 
307. Id. at 241. 
308. Id.
309. Id. at 243–45. 
310. Id. at 246, 248. 
311. Id. at 246. 
312. Id. at 249 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (Justice O’Connor was joined by Justice Brennan, Jus-
tice Marshall, and Justice Stevens). 
313. Id. at 249–51. 
314. Id. at 251. 
38800-m
qt_100-2 Sheet No. 29 Side B      02/22/2017   09:25:38
38800-mqt_100-2 Sheet No. 29 Side B      02/22/2017   09:25:38
C M
Y K
GROHSGAL-P.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/20/17 3:51 PM
344 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [100:295 
of the property.315  The debtor had sought avoidance of the transfer on the 
ground that the prepetition sale was made when the debtor was insolvent at a 
price that was less than the “reasonably equivalent value” of the property and 
thus was avoidable Code section 548.316  Justice Scalia reasoned that “fair mar-
ket value” and “reasonably equivalent value” were not the same terms, citing 
to Black’s Dictionary.317  He then considered the law of fraudulent transfers 
beginning with the Statute of 13 Elizabeth in 1570 and the history of foreclosure 
law in England,318 and majestically summarized the grand sweep of centuries 
of interplay between state law and bankruptcy law regarding fraudulent trans-
fers, all the while leaving the text struggling in his wake.319
Justice Scalia held that the term “reasonably equivalent value” in the fraud-
ulent transfer provision of section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code does not require 
a foreclosure sale to yield a certain minimum price beyond what state foreclo-
sure law requires.320  A higher degree of clarity in the Code’s text was required 
to demonstrate that Congress, when it enacted the Code, meant to depart from 
pre-Code state law.321  Surely, he acknowledged, Congress has the power under 
its constitutional grant of authority to enact uniform bankruptcy laws that would 
“disrupt the ancient harmony that foreclosure law and fraudulent conveyance 
law, those two pillars of debtor-creditor jurisprudence, have heretofore enjoyed.  
But absent clearer textual guidance than the phrase ‘reasonably equivalent 
value’—a phrase entirely compatible with pre-existing practice”—the court 
would “not presume such a radical departure.”322  “To displace traditional state 
regulation” of property rights, “the federal statutory purpose must be ‘clear and 
manifest.’”323  The Code “will be construed to adopt, rather than to displace, 
pre-existing state law,” absent such manifest clarity.324  He concluded that “rea-
sonably equivalent value” could not be interpreted to mean any certain value, 
but only “the price in fact received at the foreclosure sale, so long as all the 
requirements of the State’s foreclosure law have been complied with.”325
Justice Souter’s dissent was a textualist critique of Justice Scalia’s extra-
315. BFP v. Resolution Tr. Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 533–34, 548 (1994). 
316. Id. at 533–34. 
317. Id. at 538 (quoting Market Value, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)). 
318. Id. at 540 (citing 13 Eliz., c. 5 (1570)). 
319. Id. at 541–42. 
320. Id. at 542–43. 
321. Id. at 543. 
322. Id.
323. Id. at 544 (quoting English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990)). 
324. Id. at 545. 
325. Id.
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textualist approach.  In Justice Souter’s view, reference to centuries-long juris-
prudence that preceded enactment of the text was unnecessary.326  The words 
and meaning of section 548(a)(2)(A) are plain, and authorize a trustee “to avoid 
certain recent prebankruptcy transfers, including those on foreclosure sales, that 
a bankruptcy court determines were not made in exchange for ‘a reasonably 
equivalent value.’”327  In Justice Souter’s view the Court, uncomfortable with 
the “eminent sense of the natural reading,” had sought “finally to place this case 
in a line of decisions in which we have held that something more than mere 
plain language is required.”328
In the 2000s Justice Ginsburg held in Howard Delivery Services that work-
ers’ compensation premiums are not entitled to priority as “claims for contri-
butions to an employee benefit plan” under Code sections 507(a)(4) or (5).329
Justice Ginsburg relied on the text and context of the applicable Code provi-
sions, and the bankruptcy objective of equal distribution.330  She emphasized 
that unlike pension provisions and group insurance plans, which are negotiated 
or granted as “pay supplements or substitutes,” workers’ compensation pre-
scriptions “have a dominant employer-oriented thrust: They modify, or substi-
tute for, the common-law tort liability to which employers were exposed for 
work-related accidents.”331  Justice Kennedy, relying primarily on the text of 
the Code and ERISA, reasoned to the contrary that “‘employee benefit plan,’ 
whether viewed as a term of art or in accordance with its plain meaning,” did
include workers’ compensation.332
The following year in Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Massachusetts, Justice 
Stevens, an unwavering critic of the textualists’ criticism of the use of legisla-
tive history,333 himself rejected a debtor’s urging that he resort to it to interpret 
326. Id. at 549 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
327. Id. at 552. 
328. Id. at 565 (internal citation omitted). 
329. Howard Delivery Serv., v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 547 U.S. 651, 658 (2006). 
330. Id. at 655. 
331. Id. at 662. 
332. Id. at 676 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
333. See John Paul Stevens, Law Without History?, The New York Review of Books (2014) 
(reviewing ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (Oxford University Press 2014)) 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/oct/23/law-without-history/ [https://perma.cc/U7ZY-
43AU] (“The risk that a lobbyist-inspired comment by an individual legislator during a floor debate 
will have an impact on a judge’s evaluation of legislative history is trivial. But the text of bills is often 
not self-explanatory, and it is necessary to read committee reports to understand the issues.”).  Compare 
Scalia and Garner, one of whose “Thirteen Falsities Exposed” is “[t]he false notion that committee 
reports and floor speeches are worthwhile aids in statutory construction.”  Justice Scalia and Garner 
nonetheless recognize the validity of certain uses of legislative history, including for the purpose of 
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Code section 706(a).334  The debtor sought to convert his case from chapter 7 
to chapter 13 pursuant to section 706(a).335  Section 706(a) provides that a 
debtor “may convert” from chapter 7 to another chapter without any express 
requirement of “good faith.”336  Justice Stevens relied on the entire text of the 
Bankruptcy Code in reaching his conclusion that the debtor’s “good faith” 
nonetheless is required by section 706(a).337  He began by emphasizing that 
section 706(d) provides that “a case may not be converted to a case under an-
other chapter [e.g., chapter 13] unless the debtor may be a debtor under such 
chapter.”338  Pursuant to section 1307(c), a chapter 13 case can be dismissed if 
the debtor is acting in “bad faith.”339  A debtor who is acting in “bad faith,” it 
followed, also is ineligible to convert his case to chapter 13.340  Justice Alito 
joined by two Justices dissented, arguing that the text of section 706(a) was 
clear and said nothing of “bad faith.”341
The next year Justice Thomas, surely the firmest textualist on the present 
Court, extensively analyzed section 1146 of the Bankruptcy Code in Florida
Department of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc.342  Section 1146(a) pro-
vides that “the making or delivery of an instrument of transfer under a plan 
confirmed under section 1129” of the Code “may not be taxed under any law 
imposing a stamp tax or similar tax.”343  Justice Thomas concluded that section 
1146 exempts from state property transfer tax only those transfers made pursu-
ant to and after confirmation of a plan, and not transfers made merely in con-
templation of a plan that is later confirmed.344  In reaching his conclusion, Jus-
tice Thomas also invoked a “federalism canon” that he characterized as 
requiring statutory language to “be construed strictly in favor of the States to 
establishing linguistic usage and “to refute attempted application of the absurdity doctrine—to estab-
lish that it is indeed thinkable that a particular word or phrase should mean precisely was it says,” since 
it “suffices that a single presumably rational legislator, or a single presumably rational committee, 
viewed the allegedly absurd result with equanimity.” SCALIA AND GARNER, READING LAW, supra note
48, at 369, 388. 
334. Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 374–75 (2007). 
335. Id. at 367. 
336. See id. at 376 (Alito, J., dissenting); 11 U.S.C. § 706(a) (2000). 
337. Marrama, 549 U.S. at 374. 
338. Id. at 371. 
339. See 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c) (2000). 
340. Marrama, 549 U.S. at 372–73. 
341. Id. at 376–83 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
342. Fla. Dept. of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, 554 U.S. 33, 45–52 (2008). 
343. 11 U.S.C. § 1146(a) (2012). 
344. Piccadilly Cafeterias, 554 U.S. at 46. 
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prevent unwarranted displacement of their tax laws.”345  Justice Thomas re-
jected the debtor’s argument that requiring the debtor to pay the tax would un-
dermine its ability to reorganize, a fundamental purpose of the Code.346  He 
reasoned that the Code’s purposes are more complex and conflicting than those 
of a remedial statute and that “Chapter 11 strikes a balance between a debtor’s 
interest in reorganizing and restructuring its debts and the creditors’ interest in 
maximizing the value of the bankruptcy estate,” and also accommodates “the 
interests of the States in regulating property transfers by ‘generally [leaving] 
the determination of property rights in the assets of a bankrupt’s estate to state 
law.’”347  Justice Breyer (with Justice Stevens) dissented, on the ground that the 
text of section 1146 was temporally ambiguous, yet supplied “a clear enough 
rule—transfers are exempt when there is confirmation and are not exempt when 
there is no confirmation,” without regard to whether the transfer or confirma-
tion came first.348  Statutory interpretation in Justice Breyer’s view is not a game 
of “blind man’s bluff.”349  A judge must consider a statute’s basic purposes, and 
the “majority’s failure to work with this important tool of statutory interpreta-
tion” led it to misconstrue section 1146 in a way that ran “contrary to what 
Congress would have hoped for and expected.”350
In Hall v. United States, in the 2010s, Justice Sotomayor relied on the text, 
context, and structure of the Bankruptcy Code and provisions of the Internal 
Revenue Code to conclude that a capital gains tax on the sale of a farm in chap-
ter 12 was not a liability “incurred by the estate” within the meaning of the 
administrative expense provision of Code section 503.351  The tax thus was not 
payable by the estate, but was the debtors’ nondischargeable responsibility to 
pay.352  The majority rejected the debtors’ argument that the purpose of Code 
section 1222(a)(2)(A) was “to provide debtors with robust relief from tax 
debts.”353  Justice Breyer with three fellow Justices dissented.354  Justice Breyer 
345. Id. at 48–50 (citing Nat’l Private Truck Council v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 515 U.S. 582, 590 
(1995) (“discussing principles of comity in taxation and the ‘federal reluctance to interfere with state 
taxation’ given the ‘strong background presumption against interference’”)). 
346. Id. at 51. 
347. Id. (quoting Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 549 U.S. 443, 450–
51 (2007)). 
348. Id. at 59 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. Hall v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1882, 1885 (2012); 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(B)(i) (2012). 
352. Hall, 132 S. Ct. at 1893. 
353. Id.
354. Id. at 1894 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (Justice Breyer’s dissent was joined by Justice Ginsburg 
and Justice Kagan). 
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would have interpreted the statute in a way that he considered more consistent 
with the Code’s language and purposes, citing legislative history and reasoning 
that courts interpreting statutes should “make significant efforts to allow the 
provisions of congressional statutes to function in the ways that the elected 
branch of Government likely intended and for which it can be held democrati-
cally accountable.”355
These opinions and others show that the Justices in their endeavors to in-
terpret the Bankruptcy Code have differed less in their interpretive philosophies 
and more in the conclusions that they have reached applying substantially sim-
ilar (though admittedly not identical) guides to construction.  Majority and dis-
senting opinions consistently have taken into account the text, purposes, and 
policies of the Bankruptcy Code and other federal law, legislative history, state 
law, pre-Code bankruptcy practice and law, and extra-textual policies (includ-
ing both a version of federalism that is deferential to state law and views of 
republicanism that emphasize democratic accountability to Congress at the fed-
eral level), and have weighed the results of each of these analyses in reaching 
their conclusions.356
This Article previously considered the state law and pre-Code practice ap-
plicable to a tenant’s status on a sale of the real property that its lease encum-
bers.  The remainder of Part VII considers the text, purposes and legislative 
history of sections 365(h), 363(e) and (f), and 361 of the Code with respect to 
the sale of real property free and clear of a lease and the tenant’s possessory 
rights.
C. The Text of Sections 365(h) and 363(f) 
A textualist analysis begins with the text.  “The words of a governing text 
are of paramount concern, and what they convey, in their context, is what the 
text means.”357  Interpretative canons are one tool by which the meaning of text 
can be ascertained. 
The whole-text or entire-text canon “calls upon the judicial interpreter to 
consider the entire text, in view of its structure and of the physical and logical 
355. Id. at 1903. 
356. In addition, other Constitutional doctrines and provisions may be invoked to determine 
whether a specific clause of the Bankruptcy Code is invalid, including separation of powers to limit 
the authority of bankruptcy courts as Article I courts to enter final judgments (Stern v. Marshall, 564 
U.S. 462, 483 (2011)), the bankruptcy clause in Article I and Eleventh Amendment to determine the 
extent of state immunity from suit (Cent. Va. Cmmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 359 (2006)), and 
the Seventh Amendment to establish the right to a civil jury trial with respect to certain avoidance 
actions (Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 42 (1989)). 
357. SCALIA AND GARNER, READING LAW, supra note 48, at 56. 
38800-m
qt_100-2 Sheet No. 32 Side A      02/22/2017   09:25:38
38800-mqt_100-2 Sheet No. 32 Side A      02/22/2017   09:25:38
C M
Y K
GROHSGAL-P.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/20/17 3:51 PM
2016] COLDER THAN A LANDLORD’S HEART? 349 
relation of its many parts.”358  Context is the “primary determinant of meaning” 
under a textualist analysis.359  A “legal instrument typically contains many in-
terrelated parts that make up the whole,” and the “entirety of the document thus 
provides the context for each of its parts.”360
1. Rejection and Sale under Sections 365(h) and 363(f) 
The Code’s entire text and structure includes sections 365(h) (tenant’s elec-
tions on the debtor-landlord’s rejection),361 363(f) (sales free and clear),362
363(e) (adequate protection of interest holders on a sale),363 and 361 (how ade-
quate protection is provided).364  Section 365(h)365 and section 363(f)366 (read 
in conjunction with sections 363(e) and 361, which 363(f) expressly implicates) 
each contains a distinct statutory meaning, direction, and protection for affected 
parties.
Section 365(h) permits a debtor-landlord with court approval to reject a 
lease.  The tenant is protected after rejection by its right to either treat the lease 
as terminated or remain in possession and continue to pay the rent.367
Section 363(f) authorizes a debtor, again with court approval, to sell the real 
property free and clear and to transform its value into cash, provided only that 
one of the five conditions of section 363(f)(1)–(5) is satisfied and that each 
holder of an interest in the property at the time of sale, including the holder of 
a lien or a leasehold estate, may request and be given adequate protection of its 
interest under sections 363(e) and 361.368  Adequate protection on a sale typi-
cally is provided by a cash payment from the proceeds, in the amount by which 
the sale results in “a decrease in the value of such entity’s interest in such prop-
erty.”369  The text of section 361 expressly values the entity’s interest based on 
its priority with respect to other interests.370  The value of a first priority lien or 
other interest “in such property” will be the full value of its lien or interest, 
358. Id. at 167. 
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. 11 U.S.C. § 365(h) (2012). 
362. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2012). 
363. 11 U.S.C. § 363(e). 
364. 11 U.S.C. § 361 (2012). 
365. 11 U.S.C. § 365(h). 
366. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f). 
367. 11 U.S.C. § 365(h). 
368. 11 U.S.C. §§ 361, 363(e)–(f). 
369. 11 U.S.C. § 361(1). 
370. 11 U.S.C. § 361. 
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provided that the value of such property is sufficient, typically by payment of 
the first proceeds to the holder of the interest, prior to any value being paid to 
the holders of other interests.371  At the other end of the priorities, the “decrease 
in the value” of an out-of-the-money subordinated lien, leasehold, or other in-
terest “in such property” that occurs on a free and clear sale of the property will 
be zero, because the value of such holder’s interest in the property is zero.372
Accordingly, it will be entitled to nothing as adequate protection. 
The text of section 365(h) does not mention what happens on a sale of the 
real property free and clear.373  Similarly, the text of section 363(f) makes no 
reference to a lease rejection and makes no distinction between a tenant’s inter-
est and other interests in the property, such as monetary liens.374  But a lease 
and the tenant’s possessory rights under that lease, both before or after a rejec-
tion under section 365(h), are clearly “interests” under section 363(f) as all of 
the courts considering the issue have recognized.375  Neither section 365(h) nor 
section 363(f) provides for any special treatment of a tenant’s interest, as op-
posed to other interests, on a sale of the property.376  As the Court stated in 
Bildisco, Congress knows “how to draft an exclusion” if its wants to —in this 
case by providing for special treatment of a tenant’s interest on a 363(f) sale—
and its failure to do so (in sections 365, 363, 361, or elsewhere) is an indication 
that Congress intended no such exclusion or special treatment.377
The surplusage canon also supports the construction of these provisions that 
treats a lease as an encumbrance and affords a tenant its bargained-for, prepeti-
tion state law rights on a sale of the property.  The surplusage canon requires 
that “if possible no word should be rendered superfluous.”378  The words of a 
statute “cannot be meaningless”379 and a provision should be given effect even 
371. 11 U.S.C. § 363. 
372. 11 U.S.C. §§ 363(1), 363(e), (f).  The same law prevailed under the 1898 Act, as amended 
by the Chandler Act. See In re 620 Church St. Bldg. Corp, 299 U.S. 24, 27 (1936) (junior mortgage 
and shares in the debtor had no value because senior claims exceeded the value of the property; because 
there was “no value to be protected” the holders of those junior, out-of-the-money interests were not 
entitled to adequate protection under the plan). See also discussion infra Part VII, C., 3.
373. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(h) (2012). 
374. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f). 
375. See, e.g., In re Scimeca Found., 497 B.R. 753, 786–88 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2013); In re Extra
Room, 2011 WL 846448, at *2 (Bankr. D. Ariz. Mar. 7, 2011); In re Haskell, 321 B.R. 1, 6 (Bankr. D. 
Mass. 2005); In re Hill, 307 B.R. 821, 826 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2004).  See also e.g., In re Downtown 
Athletic Club of N.Y.C., 2000 WL 744126, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 9, 2000); In re Taylor, 198 B.R. 142, 
162 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1996). 
376. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(h); 11 U.S.C. § 363(f). 
377. NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 523 (1984). 
378. SCALIA AND GARNER, READING LAW, supra note 48, at 168. 
379. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936). 
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if it “seems to the court unjust or unfortunate.”380  “If a provision is susceptible 
of (1) a meaning that gives it an effect already achieved by another provision, 
or that deprives another provision of all independent effect, and (2) another 
meaning that leaves both provisions with some independent operation, the latter 
should be preferred.”381
Each of the words, “rejects” in section 365(h) and “sell” in 363(f), operates 
independently and achieves a different but complementary effect with respect 
to the affected tenant and debtor.  Section 365(h) provides that a rejection of 
the lease by the debtor-landlord does not dispossess the tenant.382  Section 
363(f) allows for the sale of the property and protects the tenant in the property 
by payment of adequate protection in the amount of the value of the tenant’s 
interest in the property.383  The surplusage canon requires a construction that 
gives these different provisions—one that is applicable to a rejection and the 
other to a sale—independent meanings, and that does not render one or the other 
superfluous.  That is the most natural reading of these provisions.  Section 
365(h) permits a tenant to “retain its rights” including “possession” if the land-
lord-debtor “rejects” the lease.384  Section 363(f) authorizes a debtor to “sell” 
property free and clear of the tenant’s interest,385 and section 363(e) entitles a 
tenant, if the property is “sold,” to the court’s conditioning “such . . . sale . . . 
as is necessary to provide adequate protection of such interest.”386  Effect can 
be given, and under the surplusage canon must be given, to these very different 
words. 
The harmonious reading canon, though, is preeminent.  Justice Scalia and 
Garner assert that the “imperative of harmony among provisions is more cate-
gorical than most other canons . . . there can be no justification for needlessly 
rendering provisions in conflict if they can be interpreted harmoniously.”387
The canon teaches that one part of a statute “is not to be allowed to defeat an-
other, if by any reasonable construction the two can be made to stand to-
gether.”388  Only if context and other considerations including the application 
of other canons “make it impossible to apply the harmonious-reading canon” 
380. Id. at 174. 
381. Id. at 176. 
382. 11 U.S.C. § 365(h) (2012). 
383. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2012). 
384. 11 U.S.C. § 363(h). 
385. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f). 
386. 11 U.S.C. § 363(e). 
387. SCALIA AND GARNER, READING LAW, supra note 48, at 180. 
388. Id. (citations omitted). 
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does the general/specific canon apply.389  As set forth in the preceding para-
graphs, sections 365(h) and 363(f)—the former of which concerns a lease re-
jection and the latter of which applies to a sale of the property—can be, should 
be, and most naturally are construed in a way that results in their being compat-
ible and not contradictory. 
As discussed above, sections 365(h) and 363(f) can be harmoniously rec-
onciled, and neither contradicts the other.  But even if that were not the case, 
the general/specific canon does not lead to a different result, notwithstanding 
the reliance on it by the district court in Precision Industries (discussed in Part 
III.B above) and some post-Precision courts (discussed in Part IV.B above).  
The general/specific canon requires that, if conflicting provisions simply cannot 
be reconciled, then the specific provision prevails over the general.390
The “general/specific canon is not an absolute rule, but is merely a strong 
indication of statutory meaning that can be overcome by textual indications that 
point in the other direction.”391  Both text and context sweep away any assertion 
that section 363(f) is the general and 365(h) the specific.  Textually, each ad-
dresses a different action by the debtor (the debtor-landlord’s sale free and clear 
of the lease v. the debtor-landlord’s rejection of a lease) and gives a different 
treatment to the tenant (adequate protection of the value of the tenant’s interest 
in the property v. continued possession by the tenant).392  Contextually, the two 
treatments afforded to the tenant do not exist side-by-side with respect to a sin-
gle action taken by the debtor, as they did in RadLAX Gateway Hotel with re-
spect to the fair and equitable treatment required under Code section 
1129(b)(2)(A) for confirmation of a cramdown plan over the objection of a dis-
senting secured creditor.393  To the contrary, the provisions regarding a free and 
clear sale and a rejection are found in completely different sections of the Code 
(363 and 365), that are concerned with distinct actions that a debtor may take, 
with court approval, under the Code.  One of those actions does not necessarily 
implicate the other.  A debtor can sell the property without ever rejecting the 
389. Id.
390. Id. at 183 (citing 3 JEREMY BENTHAM, A General View of A Complete Code of Laws, in
THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 155, 210 (John Bowring ed., 1843)).  The general/specific canon 
has been stated by Scalia and Garner as follows: “If there is a conflict between a general provision and 
a specific provision, the specific provision prevails (generalis specialibus non derogant).” Id.
391. RadLAX Gateway Hotel v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065, 2072 (2012). 
392. Compare, 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2012), with 11 U.S.C. § 365(h) (2012). 
393. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, 132 S. Ct. at 2071–72. See also, e.g., In re Visteon Corp., 612 
F.3d 210, 224 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Mobley, 956 F.2d 450, 452–53 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(“A ‘fundamental canon of statutory construction’ is that where a section of a statute does not include 
a specific term or phrase used elsewhere in the statute, ‘the drafters did not wish such a requirement to 
apply.’”)).
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lease, and can reject the lease without ever selling the property.  Neither section 
363(f) nor 365(h) is a “general” or “residual” provision, such as a secured cred-
itor’s right in a cramdown plan to the “indubitable equivalent” of its claim under 
section 1129(b)(2)(A) (iii) as was the case in RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC.394
Each of sections 363(f) and 365(h) instead is a free-standing and co-equal Code 
provision that addresses the treatment of a tenant’s interest in a case in which 
the debtor is the landlord—the former on a free and clear sale, and the latter on 
a rejection. 
That a debtor in some cases may both reject a lease and sell the property 
free and clear does not change this.  The fact that cats sometimes climb trees 
and that crows sometimes walk on the ground does not make either phenome-
non the general and the other the specific.  Each is simply a different animal 
utilizing a different kind of locomotion. 
2. The Disjunctive Requirements of Sections 363(f)(1)–(5) 
As set forth above there is no basis on which section 365(h) should be in-
terpreted to rearrange the bargained-for priorities of the parties’ prepetition 
property rights on a sale under section 363(f).395  This conclusion does not ne-
cessitate consideration of the five disjunctive conditions for a free and clear sale 
under sections 363(f)(1)–(5).396
Yet several courts since Precision have construed the first and/or fifth of 
those disjunctive requirements to preclude a sale free and clear of a lease.  
Those decisions also effectively elevate the priority of a subordinate leasehold 
estate, even one that is out-of-the-money, over prior encumbrances in contra-
vention of the parties’ prepetition bargained-for property rights.397  Accord-
ingly, I briefly consider next the text of sections 363(f)(1) and (5) in the context 
394. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, 132 S. Ct. at 2073 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)). 
395. See supra Part VII.C.1. 
396. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(1)–(5). 
397. Dishi & Sons v. Bay Condos, 510 B.R. 696, 708–12 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014) (considering 
both section 363(f)(1) and (5)); In re Patriot Place, Ltd., 486 B.R. 773, 815–16 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 
2013) (rejecting the argument “that a theoretical eminent domain proceeding could compel the tenant 
to accept a money satisfaction for its leasehold interest,” and failing to consider TWA in which the 
Third Circuit held that a hypothetical chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding, in which the entity could be 
compelled to accept a money satisfaction (in that case zero), fulfilled the requirement of section 
365(f)(5)); In re Haskell, 321 B.R. 1, 8–9 (Bankr. D. Mass 2005) (which cited but did not attempt to 
distinguish TWA, decided the year before).  The Ninth Circuit BAP also interpreted section 363(f)(5) 
to require an “actual” rather than a “hypothetical” proceeding. In re PW, 391 B.R. 25, 41, 45–46 (9th 
Cir. BAP 2008) (“Clear Channel”). It viewed section 363(f)(5) as requiring “at least three elements: 
that (1) a proceeding exists or could be brought, in which (2) the nondebtor could be compelled to 
accept a money satisfaction of (3) its interest.” Id. at 41 (emphasis added).  The BAP then determined 
that the term “proceeding” meant and was limited to a non-bankruptcy proceeding currently available 
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of the state foreclosure law presently in force that also animated free and clear 
sales of real property in bankruptcy cases for more than 130 years prior to the 
enactment of the Code, which analysis further supports the vindication of the 
parties’ bargained-for, prepetition rights. 
A debtor in possession or trustee may sell property free and clear of any 
interest, including a lease, under section 363(f)(1) if: “(1) applicable nonbank-
ruptcy law permits sale of such property free and clear of such interest.”398  Sec-
tion 363(f)(5) permits a sale free and clear by the debtor in possession or trustee 
if: “(5) such entity could be compelled, in a legal or equitable proceeding, to 
accept a money satisfaction of such interest.”399
Interpreting the text of section 363(f)(1) requires inquiry into the meaning 
of the “applicable” “nonbankruptcy” law that permits the “sale” of property free 
of an interest.  I will consider each in turn. 
Merriam-Webster defines the term “applicable” to mean “capable of or suit-
able for being applied” or “able to be applied or used in a particular situa-
tion.”400  Black’s Law Dictionary similarly construes “applicable” as “[c]apable 
of being applied; fit and right to be applied.”401  The term “capable” used in 
each definition means “able to do something: having the qualities or abilities 
that are needed to do something.”402
“Nonbankruptcy” is a specialized term that has no common meaning other 
than “[n]ot of or pertaining to bankruptcy.”403  The Supreme Court has resolved 
this issue conclusively, though, holding in Butner that state law is the nonbank-
ruptcy law applicable to the determination of the parties’ respective property 
rights in a bankruptcy case.404  Moreover, “[t]he justifications for application of 
state law are not limited to ownership interests” such as fee estates and lease-
hold estates.405  “[T]hey apply with equal force to security interests . . . .”406
The Butner court further acknowledged and embraced the consequence that 
to the debtor.  Since no such proceeding was available to the debtor in the Clear Channel case the 
debtor could not sell fee and clear under § 363(f)(5). Id. at 45–46. 
398. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(1). 
399. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(5). 
400. Applicable, MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2008), https://www.merriam-web-
ster.com/dictionary/applicable [https://perma.cc/47BJ-FCVY]. 
401. Applicable, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
402. Capable, MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2008), https://www.merriam-web-
ster.com/dictionary/capable [https://perma.cc/ZTT6-9YGL]. 
403. Nonbankruptcy, INTERNATIONAL-DICTIONARY.COM, http://international-
dictionary.com/definitions/?english_word=nonbankruptcy [https://perma.cc/D7UL-YXMC]. 
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“[b]ecause the applicable law varies from State to State, the results in federal 
bankruptcy proceedings will also vary.”407  What follows from this doctrine, the 
court continued, “is that the federal bankruptcy court should take whatever 
steps are necessary to ensure that the mortgagee is afforded in federal bank-
ruptcy court the same protection he would have under state law if no bankruptcy 
had ensued.”408
But which “applicable nonbankruptcy” state law permits a “sale” of real 
property free and clear of an interest, such as a lease or a mortgage, under sec-
tion 363(f)(1)?  The decisions have focused on two: eminent domain and fore-
closure law.409  The first interpretation must be rejected on textual grounds upon 
consideration of the term “sale.”  A taking by eminent domain is not a “sale” 
under section 363(f)(1).410  It is true that a state law condemnation proceeding 
results in a compulsory transfer to the state or its designee of property free of a 
party’s rights in that property.  But “‘[e]minent domain,’ in its simplest terms, 
is the inherent power of a governmental entity to take privately owned property 
and convert it to public use.  More specifically, ‘eminent domain’ is the power 
of a governmental entity to take private property for a public use without the 
owner’s consent, conditioned upon the payment of just compensation.”411  Em-
inent domain law does not operate by a “sale” to the state or its designee.412
The law of condemnation thus, on construction of the Code’s text, is not the 
“applicable nonbankruptcy law” that “permits sale of such property free and 
clear” under section 363(f)(1), because eminent domain accomplishes its ends 
by a “taking.”  It does not do so by a “sale,” the term used in section 363(f)(1). 
State foreclosure law by comparison qualifies as “applicable nonbank-
ruptcy” state law that “permits a sale” of real property “free and clear” under 
section 363(f)(1).413  Foreclosure achieves its purpose and effectuates transfer 
by a sale, either to a third party buyer or to the mortgagee who credit bids at the 
sale, and not by a taking.414  A state law foreclosure sale can be made free and 
clear of any lease that is subordinate to the mortgage lien on which the foreclo-
sure proceeding is based.415  If the lease is subordinate to a mortgage securing 
407. Id. at 53 (1898 Act case); Nobelman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 329 (1993) (1978 
Code case). 
408. Butner, 440 U.S. at 56. 
409. See, e.g., In re Haskell, 321 B.R. 1, 9 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2005). 
410. 26 AM. JUR. 2d Eminent Domain § 2 (2014).
411. Id.
412. See id. § 1. 
413. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(1) (2012) (emphasis added). 
414. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES, § 8.2 cmt. a (AM. LAW. INST. 1997). 
415. See supra Part V. 
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a claim in excess of the sale proceeds, then the tenant will be paid nothing and 
the lease will end.416
But if the lease instead has priority over the monetary lien, then a state law 
foreclosure sale must be made subject to the lease, and the lease will survive 
the sale.417  The lease with priority over the mortgage simply rides through, and 
again, none of the sale proceeds are paid to the tenant.418  State foreclosure sale 
law was the “applicable nonbankruptcy” law utilized by the Supreme Court and 
lower courts prior to the Bankruptcy Code,419 and the use of the term “sale” in 
section 363(f)(1) provides textual support for its continued application under 
the Code.  This interpretation moreover preserves the parties’ bargained-for, 
prepetition property rights, in the order of their respective priorities against the 
debtor’s real property, and vindicates those rights as required under the Bank-
ruptcy Code per Butner.
A textual analysis of the fifth disjunctive condition for a free and clear sale 
leads to the same result, but has its application to a different factual situation.  
Section 363(f)(5) provides that the trustee or debtor in possession may sell free 
and clear of “any interest” if the entity holding the interest “could be compelled, 
in a legal or equitable proceeding, to accept a money satisfaction of such inter-
est.”420
A lively debate has arisen regarding whether the “legal or equitable pro-
ceeding” by which the holder of an interest “could be” compelled “to accept a 
money satisfaction” under section 363(f)(5) must be an actual proceeding pres-
ently available to the trustee or debtor in possession.421  The key terms here 
include “could be,” the synonyms for which include “might be,” “perhaps,” 
“imaginably” and “conceivably.”422  These definitions support the view of some 
courts, including the bankruptcy courts in Boston Generating and In re Jolan, 
Inc. and the Third Circuit in TWA, that a hypothetical proceeding, such as a 
foreclosure proceeding under state law or a chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding, 
satisfies section 363(f)(5).423  That the antonyms for “could be” are “certainly,” 
416. See supra Part V. 
417. See supra Part V. 
418. See supra Part V. 
419. See supra Part V. 
420. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(5) (2012). 
421. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
422. Could Be, THEASURUS.COM,  http://www.thesaurus.com/browse/could%20be?s=t (last vis-
ited Feb. 7, 2017). 
423. EEOC v. Knox-Schillinger (In re Trans World Airlines), 322 F.3d 283, 290–91 (3d Cir. 
2003); In re Bos. Generating, 440 B.R. 302, 333 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Jolan, 403 B.R. 866, 
869–70 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2009). 
38800-m
qt_100-2 Sheet No. 36 Side A      02/22/2017   09:25:38
38800-mqt_100-2 Sheet No. 36 Side A      02/22/2017   09:25:38
C M
Y K
GROHSGAL-P.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/20/17 3:51 PM
2016] COLDER THAN A LANDLORD’S HEART? 357 
“definitely,” and “surely” further supports this view.424  But other synonyms for 
“could be”—including “can be,” “feasible,” and “obtainable”—buttress the po-
sition taken by some courts that an actual proceeding must be available to the 
debtor in possession or the trustee.425
Additional though minor support for the “hypothetical” proceeding inter-
pretation comes from the fact that the term “legal or equitable proceeding” is 
directly preceded and modified by “a,” an indefinite article.426  The indefinite 
article “a” is one “used in English to refer to a person or thing that is not iden-
tified or specified.”427  The phrase “in a legal or equitable proceeding” in con-
text suggests a proceeding that is “hypothetical,” one definition of which is “not 
real: imagined as an example.”428
Of greater linguistic significance, though, the term “could be” precedes and 
modifies the word “compelled” in section 363(f)(5).429  It does not directly qual-
ify the phrase “in a legal or equitable proceeding.”430  It thus more accurately 
defines whether the holder of the interest “can be” compelled to accept a money 
satisfaction in “a legal or equitable proceeding,” such as because the interest is 
subordinate to the interest being foreclosed upon,431 and not whether that pro-
ceeding must be an “actual” proceeding. 
Decisively, though, construing section 363(f)(5) to require an “actual” ra-
ther than a “hypothetical” proceeding makes little sense when section 365(f) is 
read in the context of section 541(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.  Under section 
541(a), the commencement of a bankruptcy case creates an estate “comprised 
of all . . . legal and equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the com-
mencement of the case.”432  The scope of “property of the estate” is very broad, 
and includes causes of action that the debtor has at the commencement of the 
case or that it acquires after the commencement of the case.433
424. Could Be, THEASURUS.COM, http://www.thesaurus.com/browse/could%20be?s=t (last vis-
ited Feb. 7, 2017). 
425. Id.
426. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(5) (2012). 
427. A, MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2008). 
428. Hypothetical, MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2008). 
429. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(5). 
430. See id.
431. For example, in a state law foreclosure proceeding, the holder of an encumbrance against 
real property cannot be compelled to accept a money satisfaction if it has priority over the lien being 
foreclosed on, or if the foreclosing plaintiff elects not to “name” a subordinate encumbrance and the 
holder of it in the proceeding. 
432. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)–(a)(1) (2012). 
433. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1), (7).  See, e.g., La. World Exposition v. Fed. Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 233, 
245 (5th Cir. 1988) (citing United States v. Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. 198, 205–06 (1983)). 
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Interpreting section 363(f)(5) to require an “actual” proceeding presently 
available to the debtor would make section 541(a) superfluous, because a debtor 
does not need section 363(f)(5) to bring and pursue a cause of action that al-
ready is property of the estate under section 541(a).  The canon of surplusage 
dictates against an interpretation that requires an “actual” proceeding under sec-
tion 363(f)(5), because section 541(a) renders section 363(f)(5) superfluous.434
Does adopting this construction of section 363(f)(5) to include a hypothet-
ical foreclosure proceeding swallow up and make the other disjunctive condi-
tions of section 363(f) superfluous?  Several courts have reached that conclu-
sion.435  But the better argument with respect the sale of property encumbered 
by a lease is “no.”  Rather, the disjunctive provisions to a free and clear sale 
under section 363(f)(1), (2), and (5) appear to have been designed to afford the 
parties their respective state law property rights in the order of priority that 
would be obtained in a hypothetical foreclosure proceeding, with the additional 
feature that the tenant under a first priority lease, who would not be dispos-
sessed in such a proceeding, can consent to the sale and “cash out” its position 
rather than remain in possession. 
First, a tenant under a first priority lease is entitled to remain in possession 
unless it consents to the sale free and clear of its interest, for the following rea-
sons.  State foreclosure law, which I argue is “applicable nonbankruptcy law” 
under section 363(f)(1), does not permit sale of the property free and clear of a 
first priority lease.436  The foreclosure sale by the junior lienor would instead 
be subject to that lease.437  Using a hypothetical state law foreclosure proceed-
ing as the “legal or equitable proceeding” referred to in section 363(f)(5), the 
first priority tenant also could not be compelled to accept a money satisfaction 
434. SCALIA AND GARNER, READING LAW, supra note 48, at 168.  Moreover, these words in 
section 363(f)(5) also obtain a very certain meaning when read in the context of the bankruptcy law of 
free and clear sales that existed at the time the Bankruptcy Code was enacted.  Several courts post-
Precision courts have reasoned that section 363(f)(5) “does not refer to foreclosure proceedings be-
cause they are initiated by creditors, not the debtor.”  Dishi & Sons v. Bay Condos, 510 B.R. 696, 711 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing In re Scott, 2013 WL 4498987, at *2–3 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. Aug. 21, 
2013)). The Supreme Court for more than a century prior to enactment of the Code considered a state 
law foreclosure sale precisely the kind of hypothetical proceeding applicable to a free and clear sale, 
by which the holder of an interest could be compelled to accept a money satisfaction of its interest. See
discussion supra Part V. 
435. See, e.g., Dishi, 510 B.R. at 711 (citing In re Scott, 2013 WL 4498987, at *2–3; In re PW,
391 B.R. 25, 44 (9th Cir. BAP 2008)). 
436. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(1) (2012). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES, §
7.1 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1997).
437. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES, § 7.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1997). See supra
Part V. 
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of its interest.438
But the tenant’s power to consent to bankruptcy sale free and clear of its 
lease offers a different outcome for the tenant under a first priority lease.  A 
tenant who consents to the sale free and clear of its first priority lease under 
section 363(f)(2) will be entitled to payment of the first proceeds as adequate 
protection under sections 361(1) and 363(e).439  The tenant under a first priority 
lease who makes that election can cash out its position to the extent of the value 
of its lease.440
Second, the tenant under a subordinate lease is subject to two different treat-
ments that again comport with both state foreclosure law and the provisions of 
section 363(f).  If the subordinate lease is out-of-the-money because the prior 
liens and encumbrances against the property equal or exceed the value of the 
property, then the value of the tenant’s interest for purposes of adequate pro-
tection under the Code and on a state foreclosure law sale is nothing.441  On 
such facts, the property can be sold free and clear of the lease under section 
363(f)(1), because “applicable nonbankruptcy law,” i.e., a foreclosure proceed-
ing, permits such sale free and clear without payment to the tenant.442
If, however, the lease is subordinate but is in-the-money because sale pro-
ceeds remain after payment of prior liens and encumbrances, then the sale can 
be made free and clear of the lease and the tenant can be compelled under 
363(f)(5) to accept (and is entitled to) a money satisfaction.443  This payment 
will consist of the lease value to the extent of remaining proceeds.  This out-
come, again, is the same that will be achieved on a state law foreclosure sale, 
which is the hypothetical legal or equitable proceeding recognized by the Su-
preme Court under all of the prior Bankruptcy Acts to be applicable to a free 
and clear sale in bankruptcy.444
Under the analysis that I urge, neither section 363(f)(1) nor (5) subsume 
one another or the other disjunctive conditions of 363(f)(2), (3), or (4) by per-
mitting a sale free and clear of a lease under all circumstances.  Section 
363(f)(2) permits a sale free and clear of a first priority lease on the consent of 
the tenant, which neither 363(f)(1) or (5) ordinarily would allow.  Section 
363(f)(1) permits a sale free and clear of a subordinate lease that is out-of-the-
438. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(5). 
439. 11 U.S.C. § 361(1), 363(e) (2012). 
440. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(2). 
441. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(1). 
442. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(1). 
443. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(5). 
444. See discussion supra Part V. 
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money.445  Section 363(f)(5) permits a sale free and clear of a subordinate lease 
that is in-the-money, in whole or in part.446  Each section addresses a different 
circumstance under which the sale is conducted.447
3. A Tenant under an Out-of-the-Money, Subordinate Lease Is Not Entitled 
to Adequate Protection as the “Indubitable Equivalent of its Lease” 
What of possession as adequate protection—Should a tenant under an out-
of-the-money subordinate lease be entitled to possession because possession is 
the “indubitable equivalent” of its interest in the property under section 361(3) 
and is the only means by which that interest can be adequately protected?  Such 
a determination is contrary to the text of sections 361 and 363(e). 
A dispossessed tenant is entitled to adequate protection of its interest under 
section 363(e), but only to the extent that, pursuant to section 361(1), the “sale” 
free and clear “results in a decrease in the value of such entity’s interest in such 
property” that was sold.448  The interest of a tenant under an out-of-the-money 
subordinate lease in the property being sold is zero, and the tenant should re-
ceive just that.  The same treatment would be afforded to an out-of-the-money 
monetary lien or other encumbrance on a sale under section 363(f), on a bank-
ruptcy sale under pre-Code law, and on a state law foreclosure sale.449  If value 
of the property as reflected by the sale proceeds exceeds the amounts paid to 
the holders of prior liens, encumbrances, and other interests, then the interest 
of the tenant in the property still has value.  The value is represented by the 
remaining proceeds of the property sold free and clear, capped at the value of 
the lease.450
445. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(1). 
446. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(5). 
447. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(1)–(5).  Two remaining disjunctive conditions, also address different 
facts: section 363(f)(3) permits a sale free and clear of a lien if “the price at which such property is to 
be sold is greater than the aggregate value of all liens on such property,” and section 363(f)(4) permits 
such sale if such “interest is in bona fide dispute.” 
448. 11 U.S.C. § 363(e), 361(1) (2012) (emphasis added). 
449. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(f); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 7.1 (AM. LAW.
INST. 1996); Houston v. City Bank of New Orleans, 47 U.S. 486, 504–06 (1848) (applying pre-Code 
law). 
450. Section 361(2) adds one wrinkle to this analysis, though it does not change the outcome.  
Under section 361(2), adequate protection may be provided to the entity by “an additional or replace-
ment lien” to the extent that such . . .  sale . . . results in a decrease in the value of such entity’s interest 
in such property.” 11 U.S.C. § 361(2).  Unless a lease is characterized as a “lien,” it is difficult to see 
how the tenant could be given an “additional or replacement lien” as adequate protection under 361(2).  
Section 101(37) defines a “lien” to mean a “charge against or interest in property to secure payment of 
a debt or performance of an obligation.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(37) (2012). It is difficult to argue that a lease 
“secures the payment of a debt or performance of an obligation,” and thus section 361(2) likely has no 
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The “indubitable equivalent” provision of 361(3) does not alter this re-
sult.451  The entity that holds the interest is entitled only to “such other relief . . .
as will result in the realization of the indubitable equivalent of such entity’s 
interest in such property.”452  The “indubitable equivalent” of an out-of-the-
money subordinate tenant’s “interest in such property” being sold is zero.453
The tenant under such a lease is not entitled to possession as the “indubitable 
equivalent” of its interest in the property as the courts in Dishi and Haskell
determined, because that interest is, again, zero.454  The out-of-the-money, sub-
ordinate lease is no different than an out-of-the-money subordinate mortgage 
or judgment lien.  The holder has no remaining “interest in such property” and 
is entitled to nothing on the sale.455
4. Summary of the Code’s Text Regarding a Sale Free and Clear of a Lease 
Each of sections 365(h) and 363(f) therefore has particular applications 
with respect to a lease encumbering a debtor’s property that does not render the 
other section superfluous.  Textual analysis of these sections supports a con-
struction that if the debtor “rejects” the lease, and that is all that has occurred, 
then the tenant is entitled to elect to remain in possession.456  If instead the 
debtor determines to “sell” the property then, whether or not the lease has been 
application to a sale free and clear of a lease.  Even if the term “lien” is interpreted to include a “lease,” 
though, adequate protection would be limited to the value of the lease on the sale in relation to the 
other encumbrances against the property, i.e., the value of the tenant’s “interest in such property,” 
which is zero if the lease is subordinate and out-of-the-money. 
451. 11 U.S.C. § 361(3). 
452. Id.
453. Id.
454. Dishi & Sons v. Bay Condos, 510 B.R. 696, 711–12 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); In re Haskell, 321 
B.R. 1, 10 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2005). 
455. In addition, sections 361(1) and (2) each expressly refer to adequate protection resulting 
from a diminution in value on a “sale,” while the “indubitable equivalent” standard in section 361(3) 
makes no reference to a “sale.”  Thus, section 361(3) is arguably a catchall provision, that has no 
application to a “sale.”“ The Supreme Court in Radlax made clear that the “indubitable equivalent” 
treatment to which a secured creditor is entitled under a cramdown plan under section 
1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) is the “catchall” provision of section 1129(b)(2)(A), and cannot be used to alter the 
treatment on a “sale” pursuant to a plan as specified in section 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii).  RadLAX Gateway 
Hotel v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065, 2072 (2012). The “indubitable equivalent” provision of 
section 361(3) similarly may be characterized as a catchall provision that does not alter the treatment 
afforded to the holder of an interest on a “sale” under section 361(1).  The argument is weaker here 
than for section 1129(b)(2)(A), though, because the introductory language of section 361 refers gener-
ally to section 363.  Thus, it is conceivable that section 361 may be construed to make section 361(3) 
applicable to a free and clear sale under section 363(f).  But even if section 361(3) has some application, 
the value of a tenant’s “interest in such property” sold free and clear of its out-of-the-money subordi-
nate lease remains zero, and the “indubitable equivalent” of zero remains zero. 
456. 11 U.S.C § 365(h) (2012). 
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rejected, the tenant’s treatment depends on the priority and value of the lease in 
relation to the value of the property and other encumbrances.457
Each of sections 363(f)(1), (2), and (5) also provides a specific function if 
the debtor determines to sell the property.458  These depend on whether the lease 
is subordinate or has first priority, whether the tenant under a first priority lease 
has consented to the sale, and in both cases on the value of the property.459
Specifically, if the sale is free and clear of a lease that is subordinate to 
monetary liens, then under the “applicable nonbankruptcy law” of section 
363(f)(1) the sale can be made free and clear of the tenant’s interest under the 
lease even if the sale proceeds are insufficient to pay anything to the tenant.460
But if sale proceeds remain available for distribution to the tenant under a sub-
ordinate lease, then the tenant is entitled to full or partial payment and the sale 
may go forward because the tenant “could be compelled” in a hypothetical fore-
closure proceeding “to accept a money satisfaction” of its interest under section 
363(f)(5).461  Finally, if the lease has first priority, then the tenant is entitled to 
remain in possession, and neither 363(f)(1) nor 363(f)(5) can be used to oust 
it.462  But if the first priority tenant consents to the sale under section 363(f)(2), 
or another condition of section 363(f) is satisfied, then the sale can be made free 
and clear of the lease,463 on payment to the tenant of the first proceeds of sale 
in an amount not in excess of value of the tenant’s leasehold.464
In each of these examples, the tenant is entitled to receive as adequate pro-
tection on a sale the amount that is equal to “the value of such entity’s [the 
tenant’s] interest in such property,” nothing more and nothing less.465  If the 
lease is subordinate and out-of-the-money, then the free and clear sale has not 
resulted in a “decrease in the value of such entity’s interest in such property,” 
and the “indubitable equivalent of such entity’s interest in such property” is 
zero.466  Accordingly, such tenant should not be entitled to remain in possession 
or be paid anything. 
457. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f). 
458. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(1)–(2), (5). 
459. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(1)–(2), (5). 
460. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(1). 
461. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(5). 
462. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(1), (5). 
463. In such event, the tenant under such first priority lease will be entitled to the proceeds of 
sale in an amount up to the value of its lease, prior to any distribution to any other holders of interests 
against the property. 
464. 11 U.S.C §§ 361, 363(e), 363(f)(1), 363(f)(5) (2012). 
465. 11 U.S.C § 361(1), (3). 
466. Id.
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This construction, in addition to being consistent with state law property 
rights under Butner and pre-Code law and practice, adequately accounts for all 
of the applicable linguistic components467 of sections 365(h) and 363(f) and 
renders no word of these statutory provisions superfluous, idle, or nugatory.468
The text of sections 365(h) and 363(f) thus supports the conclusion that a debtor 
may sell real property free and clear of a subordinate lease and the debtor’s 
possessory rights, whether or not the lease has been rejected.  Permitting the 
tenant under a lease to remain in possession notwithstanding that the lease is 
subordinate to liens and other interests in the property finds no support in the 
text of the Bankruptcy Code. 
D. Interpreting the Text of Sections 365(h) and 363(f) in the Context of the 
Purposes of the Bankruptcy Code 
The Bankruptcy Code’s purposes of equitable distribution, maximizing 
payments to creditors, and reorganization are furthered by a conclusion that a 
tenant cannot use section 365(h) to preserve its subordinate lease or possessory 
rights on a free and clear sale under section 363(f).469
A first priority tenant that either retains its leasehold interest in the property 
(as it would under state law) or is paid the value of its lease from the first pro-
ceeds of sale will receive the value of its prepetition state law interest in the 
debtor’s property.470  In the case of a subordinate lease, the distribution of the 
sale proceeds to the tenant up to the amount of the lease value, after the payment 
of prior liens and encumbrances, similarly affords the tenant the value of its 
prepetition state law interest in the debtor’s property that is being sold, even 
when the amount is zero.471  Each of these treatments results in the equitable 
distribution of the debtor’s property in accordance with the non-debtor parties’ 
prepetition state law rights per Butner, reduces uncertainty, discourages forum 
shopping, and prevents a party from receiving “a windfall merely by reason of 
the happenstance of bankruptcy.”472
What of maximizing the value of the bankruptcy estate?  This policy is fur-
thered by a sale that is free and clear of any lease.  A free and clear sale will 
467. SCALIA AND GARNER, READING LAW, supra note 48, at 174 (quoting E.D. HIRSCH,
VALIDITY IN INTERPRETATION 236 (1967)). 
468. SCALIA AND GARNER, READING LAW, supra note 48, at 168. See also id. at 174 (quoting 
THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE 
LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 58 (1868)). 
469. See discussion supra Part I. 
470. See discussion supra Part I. 
471. See discussion supra Part I. 
472. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) (quoting Lewis v. Mfrs. Nat’l Bank, 364 
U.S. 603, 609 (1961)) (1898 Act case). 
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generate bidders who want to use the property in addition to those who wish to 
purchase the property as an investment, thus increasing the likelihood that one 
or more of these potential purchasers will bid up the price.  A sale subject to a 
lease will eliminate the potential buyers who want to occupy and use the prop-
erty immediately following the closing of the sale and thus may repress bidding. 
But for this factor of encouraging or discouraging bidding, if the distribu-
tion of the sale proceeds is made in accordance with the state law priorities of 
the encumbrances against the property, as proposed by this Article, the effect 
on the policy of maximizing the value of the estate for distribution to creditors 
is neutral.  Consider a property the value of which is $1 million if it were sold 
free and clear of encumbrances.  The property, though, is subject to a first pri-
ority lease, and the lease is at a below market rental, so that the value that a 
buyer would pay for the lease is $300,000 (the “lease value”).  Assume also a 
$600,000 subordinate mortgage against the property.  If the property is sold 
subject to the lease (but free and clear of the mortgage) a buyer will be expected 
to pay $700,000 (the $1 million value of the property if it was sold free and 
clear of the lease, minus the $300,000 lease value attributable to the below-
market lease that will continue to encumber the property).  The mortgagee will 
be entitled to receive $600,000 as adequate protection under section 363(e) and 
(f).  The debtor’s estate will be left with $100,000 from the sale. 
If instead the tenant consents to the sale free and clear of the lease, the buyer 
will be expected to pay $1 million, but the $300,000 lease value will have to be 
paid to the tenant as adequate protection, in addition to the $600,000 that must 
be paid to the mortgagee.  The debtor’s estate again will be left with $100,000 
from the sale. 
If the priorities are reversed (the $600,000 mortgage has first priority and 
the lease with a $300,000 lease value is subordinate to the mortgage) then the 
distribution is reversed.  The $100,000 is still distributed to the debtor.  The 
economic effect on the debtor’s estate is the same. 
Assume instead that the free and clear value of the property is only 
$500,000 and the lease has first priority and the mortgage is subordinate to it.  
If the property is sold subject to the first priority lease, the expected sale price 
will be $200,000 ($500,000 minus the $300,000 lease value), all of which will 
be paid to the holder of the $600,000 mortgage.  Instead, if the property is sold 
free and clear of the lease, then the $500,000 of sale proceeds will be paid as 
follows: $300,000 to the tenant for the lease value of its first priority lease that 
has been extinguished by the sale and, again, $200,000 to the mortgagee, and 
nothing to the debtor. 
If the free and clear value of the property is only $500,000 and the lease 
with a $300,000 lease value instead is subordinate to the mortgage, then the 
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holder of the $600,000 mortgage will receive the entire $500,000 in sale pro-
ceeds, and the tenant and the debtor will receive nothing.  In each of these sce-
narios, the tenant either retains the value of its lease or receives payment in an 
amount equal to the value of its interest in the property sold (which may be 
zero), the same aggregate amounts are distributed to the other entities that have 
an interest in the property sold, and the same amount is paid to the debtor’s 
estate.  The policy of equitable distribution is accomplished. 
The policy of maximizing the value of the debtor’s estate, by contrast, is 
undermined in some instances if the property must be sold subject to a lease, 
because the potential purchasers of the property will not include those who in-
tend to buy the property in order to immediately occupy and use the tenant’s 
space.  Otherwise, the effect on the policy of maximizing value is neutral. 
Finally, there is no generally discernible purpose in the Bankruptcy Code 
of protecting the non-debtor counterparty to a lease, whether landlord or tenant.  
The Code permits rejection of a lease that is burdensome to the debtor, in der-
ogation of the contract between the parties and the non-debtor party’s inter-
ests.473  Beyond that general proposition, Congress has treated landlord-tenant 
issues with discrete provisions, some of which are advantageous474 and some of 
which are disadvantageous475 to the non-debtor party.  Congress has addressed 
landlord-tenant issues by specific statutory terms aimed at specific situations.476
It is difficult if not impossible to divine a congressional purpose of protecting 
the interests of tenants over those of lien holders in a debtor-landlord’s bank-
ruptcy proceeding that transcends the general goals of equitable distribution 
based on the parties’ bargained-for, state law prepetition rights and maximizing 
the value of the estate and distributions to creditors. 
E. The Legislative History of Sections 365(h) and 363(f) Does Not Suggest 
Any Congressional Expectation that One Would Trump the Other 
The legislative history of the Code does not indicate any congressional un-
derstanding that either section 365(h) or 363(f) trumps the other.  The legisla-
tive history describes the protections for tenants under section 365(h) only in 
473. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(3) (2012). 
474. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(3) (debtor must timely perform prior to assuming or rejecting 
the lease); § 365(d)(4) (debtor must assume or reject within 120 days, which may be extended for no 
more than an additional 90 days, after which the lease is deemed rejected). 
475. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(2), (e), (f) (ipso facto provisions and prohibitions in lease 
against assignment are unenforceable); 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(6) (2012) (cap on landlord’s rejection dam-
age claim). 
476. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 365(b), (d). 
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the context of a rejection of the lease by the debtor-landlord, and does not ad-
dress what priority a tenant’s possessory interests have on a free and clear 
sale.477  Explanations of the debtor’s authority to sell free and clear of an interest 
and of the interest holders’ rights to adequate protection include reference to 
“equitable as well as legal interests,” but do not express any congressional con-
cern for a special treatment of tenants on a sale.478  The possible intersection 
between the two sections is not addressed. 
The legislative history of the Code instead indicates a congressional direc-
tion that interests in the debtor’s property should be determined based on the 
bargained-for, prepetition state law rights of the parties.  “Bankruptcy policy 
strongly favors equality of treatment of all creditors and strongly disfavors the 
creation of property rights upon the filing of a bankruptcy case. . .  Springing 
interests unfairly defeat legitimate expectations of other creditors who may 
have relied on the absence of any such prior interests in extending credit.”479
This bankruptcy policy accords with the continuation of the state law priorities 
of prepetition liens, leases, and other encumbrances against real property of the 
estate, per Nobleman and Butner.480  Interpreting section 365(h) to trump the 
prepetition state law priorities of the holders of liens, leases, and other interests 
on a section 363(f) sale defeats those other parties’ bargained-for legitimate 
expectations of what would they could expect to receive on account of their 
respective interests on a sale of the property.  Nothing in the legislative history 
suggests a congressional intent to give a tenant an interest that springs into ex-
istence on the filing of a petition, that is so sacrosanct that on a sale of property 
free and clear of a subordinate lease the tenant’s section 365(h) rights leapfrog 
and obtain priority over an existing mortgage the lender under which extended 
credit with the legitimate expectation that its lien would retain its priority.  Yet 
that is precisely the result if section 365(h) is construed to trump section 363(f). 
The cases citing legislative history or intent in support of the view that a 
subordinate tenant cannot be dispossessed by a free and clear sale cite to the 
congressional intent to protect a tenant on rejection under section 365(h).481  But 
477. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 349 (1977); S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 60 (1978); H.R. REP.
NO. 103-835, at 53 (1994). 
478. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 345 (1977); S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 49, 56 (1978). 
479. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 456 (1977). See also S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 164 (1978). 
480. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) (1898 Act case); Nobelman v. Am. Sav. 
Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 329 (1993) (1978 Code case). 
481. See, e.g., In re Revel AC, 532 B.R. 216, 228 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2015); Dishi & Sons v. Bay 
Condos 510 B.R. 696, 705–06 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014) (stating that Section 70b of the Chandler Act 
rejected “the notion that the estate should be benefitted by removal of the tenant,” and this purpose was 
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they give short (if any) shrift to the absence in the legislative history of any 
statements extending those protections to the tenant on a free and clear sale 
under section 363(f), or to the unequivocally enunciated policy in the legislative 
history against springing interests.482  Those disfavored springing interests re-
sult, contrary to such policy, from an interpretation of a tenant’s section 365(h) 
rights on rejection that reorders the priorities of liens and encumbrances on a 
sale free and clear. 
F. Did Congress in the Bankruptcy Code Clearly Indicate a Departure from 
the Long-Established Bankruptcy Practice and Law of Free and Clear Sales? 
Part VII began by asking if Congress clearly indicated that it “intended” to 
depart from or “erode prior bankruptcy practice” on a free and clear sale with 
respect to leases that are subordinate to liens and other encumbrances against 
the real property, and whether the text of the Bankruptcy Code elevates a lease 
that is subordinate under state law to the status of a first priority encumbrance 
against such property that the debtor seeks to sell.  The answers are clear. 
First, the pre-Code law and practice authorizing the sale of estate property 
free and clear of liens and encumbrances, including subordinate leases, was un-
equivocally established.483  By this doctrine, a court sitting in bankruptcy, fol-
lowing the rule for a hypothetical foreclosure sale, could order the property to 
be sold free and clear of liens and other interests, could attach those liens and 
other interests to the sale proceeds, and could direct the distribution of those 
proceeds in accordance with state law lien priorities.484  Most of the principal 
opinions, from Ex Parte Christy and Nugent v. Boyd in the 1840s construing 
the Bankruptcy Act of 1841 to Van Huffel v. Harkelrode interpreting the Act of 
1898, actually described this as a power of foreclosure, or cited with approval 
reiterated in the House and Senate Reports to the 1978 version of § 365(h), which stated that, by oper-
ation of section 365(h), “the tenant will not be deprived of his estate for the term for which bargained.” 
(citing S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 60 (1978) and H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 349 (1977))).  As argued in this 
Article, the tenant also bargained for the priority of its leasehold estate, and the text and policies of the 
Code and pre-Code law and practice mandate the preservation of those priorities on application of 
sections 365(h) and 363(f)). See also In re Zota Petroleums, 482 B.R. 154, 161 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2012); 
In re Haskell, 321 B.R. 1, 6–7 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2005); In re Taylor, 198 B.R. 142, 164–66 (Bankr. 
D.S.C. 1996); In re Churchill Props. III, Ltd. P’ship, 197 B.R. 283, 288 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996); In re 
LHD Realty Corp., 20 B.R. 717, 719 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1982). 
482. See cases cited supra note 481. 
483. See discussion supra Part VI. 
484. Ray v. Norseworthy, 90 U.S. 128, 134 (1874) (citing Houston v. City Bank of New Orleans, 
47 U.S. 486, 506 (1848)). 
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those cases that so described the power.485  The proceeding invoked was a hy-
pothetical one exercised by the representative of the bankruptcy estate and not 
by any actual mortgagee.486  The free and clear sale procedure established by 
the courts accomplished the stated purpose of reducing a bankrupt’s assets to 
cash.487
State law determined the validity and priority of liens and other interests 
against the property sold, as it does under the present Code.488  Then as now, 
under a state law foreclosure sale, the foreclosing mortgagee terminated only 
the liens and other interests that were subordinate to it.489  Under that state law, 
if a lease had priority over the foreclosing mortgage the tenant could not be 
dispossessed and was entitled to remain in possession.490  If instead the lease 
was subordinate to the foreclosing mortgage, the tenant could be dispossessed 
in the action, and would be entitled to payment of the value of its leasehold 
from the proceeds of sale after the payment of any prior mortgages and other 
liens and encumbrances.491  If the lease was subordinate and was out of the 
money, the tenant would receive nothing.492  The bankruptcy courts applied the 
same rules applicable to the priorities of the interests in the property being sold 
based on a hypothetical proceeding. 
Pre-Code case law also established the power of the representative of the 
bankrupt’s estate to reject leases and other executory contracts.493  That author-
ity ultimately was enacted by section 70b of the Chandler Act in 1938.494  There 
485. See generally Ex Parte Christy, 44 U.S. 292 (1845); Nugent v. Boyd, 44 U.S. 426 (1845); 
Van Huffel v. Harkelrode, 284 U.S. 225 (1931). 
486. Ex Parte Christy, 44 U.S. at 316–17 (1845) (Courts sitting in bankruptcy have the power 
“to redeem or foreclose, or to enforce, or to set aside such a lien, mortgage, or other security.”); Nugent 
v. Boyd, 44 U.S. 426, 437 (1845); Van Huffel, 284 U.S. at 227–28 (1931) (The Bankruptcy Act of 
1898 “contains no provision which in terms confers upon bankruptcy courts the power to sell property 
of the bankrupt free from encumbrances.  We think it clear that the power was granted by implication.  
Like power had long been exercised by federal courts sitting in equity when ordering sales by receivers 
or on foreclosure. The lower federal courts have consistently held that the bankruptcy court possesses 
the power, stating that it must be implied from the general equity powers of the court and the duty 
imposed by § 2 of the Bankruptcy Act [11 USCA s 11] to collect, reduce to money and distribute the 
estates of bankrupts, and to determine controversies with relation thereto.” (internal citations omitted)). 
487. See, e.g., Van Huffel, 284 U.S. at 228. 
488. See cases cited supra note 486. See also Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54 (1979). 
489. See supra Parts V, VI. 
490. See supra Parts V, VI. 
491. See supra Parts V, VI. 
492. See supra Part V. 
493. See cases discussed supra Part VI.C.2. 
494. Chandler Act in 1938, ch. 575, § 70(b), 52 Stat. 840 (1938). 
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are few opinions, either before or after the enactment of section 70b, that ex-
pressly considered the fate of a subordinated lease, whether or not previously 
disaffirmed or rejected, on a sale of the underlying property.495  None was by 
the Supreme Court.  But those decisions consistently recognized that though 
the debtor-landlord’s rejection of the lease in and of itself might not end a ten-
ant’s possessory leasehold estate, the tenant’s retained rights had the same pri-
ority that the lease had under state law and did not leapfrog prior liens, encum-
brances, and other interests on a sale of the property.496
The Supreme Court consistently has held that it “will not read the Bank-
ruptcy Code to erode past bankruptcy practice absent a clear indication that 
Congress intended such a departure.”497  At the time the Code was enacted, the 
power of the courts in bankruptcy to order a sale free and clear in accordance 
with state law foreclosure principles, even though no such actual proceeding 
was available to the debtor, was established by the Supreme Court’s construc-
tion of all three of the prior Bankruptcy Acts.498  The courts in bankruptcy cases 
treated leases and other estates in land sold in bankruptcy proceedings in the 
same manner on a sale as did courts in a state law foreclosure proceeding, both 
before and after the enactment of section 70b of the Chandler Act.499  Section 
70b expressly preserved a tenant’s “estate” on a landlord-debtor’s rejection but, 
as is the case with the Code, said nothing of the fate on a sale of a subordinate 
leasehold estate or the debtor’s possessory rights under it.500
Congress did not clearly indicate any change to existing bankruptcy law or 
practice regarding free and clear sales or the treatment of a lease on such a sale 
when it enacted the Bankruptcy Code in 1978 or in the subsequent amendments 
to it.  Concerns arose following the decision in In re Freeman, discussed in Part 
VI.C.2 above, regarding precisely what the term “estate” under section 70b 
meant.501  The judicial and scholarly consensus prior to enactment of the Bank-
ruptcy Code in 1978 appears to have been that the clause in section 70b that 
provided that a debtor-landlord’s rejection did “not deprive the lessee of his 
495. See discussion supra Part VI.C. 
496. Matter of Penn Cent. Trans. Co., 458 F. Supp. 1346, 1354–56 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Matter of
N.Y. Inv’rs Mut. Grp., 153 F. Supp. 772, 777 (S.D.N.Y 1957); Cohen v. E. Netherland Holding Co., 
258 F.2d 14, 16–17 (2d Cir. 1958); In re Freeman, 49 F. Supp. 163, 165 (S.D. Ga. 1943); Matter of 
Outrigger Club, 9. B.R. 152, 153 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981). See also In re Hotel Governor Clinton, 96 
F.2d 50, 51 (2d Cir. 1938) cert. denied. 305 U.S. 613 (1938) (pre-section 70b sale free and clear of 
subordinate lease). 
497. Hamilton v. Lanning. 560 U.S. 505, 517 (2010) (citations omitted). 
498. See supra Parts V, VI. 
499. See discussion supra Part VI. 
500. See discussion supra Part VI.C.2. 
501. See discussion supra Part VI.C.2. 
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estate” meant that the tenant’s “right to remain in possession for the reserved 
rent” was preserved for the remainder of the term.502  Commentators had criti-
cized In re Freeman, which held that the “estate” preserved was merely a ten-
ancy at will, terminable under state law by the landlord on two months’ notice, 
and that the trustee could alter the rent from that provided for in the lease and 
“charge and recover a reasonable rental for the demised premises until the end 
of the term.”503  Collier stated unequivocally that Freeman did “not represent 
the proper view of the effect of rejection of an unexpired lease by the debtor-
landlord” under section 70b.504
Congress in 1978 clarified the tenant’s treatment on a debtor-landlord’s re-
jection, adopting in the Code the view that the key aspects of the “estate” pre-
served by section 70b were the tenant’s right to possession for the remainder of 
the term at the rental stated in the rejected lease.505  Under Code section 365(h) 
as enacted in 1978, the tenant could elect following rejection to “remain in pos-
session for the balance of the term of such lease and any renewal or extension 
of such term that is enforceable by such lessee under applicable nonbankruptcy 
law.”506  The House Report explained that, by operation of section 365(h), if 
the debtor-landlord “rejects” the tenant can remain in possession and thus, is 
not “deprived of his estate for the term for which he bargained.”507
In 1994, Congress clarified that if the tenant elects to remain in possession 
following the debtor-landlord’s rejection, then the tenant’s surviving rights un-
der the rejected lease include “the amount and timing of payment of rent and 
other amounts payable by the lessee and any right of use, possession, quiet en-
joyment, subletting, assignment, or hypothecation[] that are in or appurtenant 
to the real property for the balance of the term of such lease and for any renewal 
or extension of such rights to the extent that such rights are enforceable under 
502. See John J. Creedon & Robert M. Zinman, Landlord’s Bankrukptcy: Laissez Les Lessees,
26 BUS. LAW. 1391, 1399, 1407, 1411–12 (1971) (citing JACOB L. WEINSTEIN, THE BANKRUPTCY
LAW OF 1938—A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 159 (1938)); James Angell McLaughlin, Amendment of 
the Bankruptcy Act, 40 HARV. L. REV. 583 (1927)). Creedon and Zinman state that McLaughlin 
“thought that the tenant’s ‘estate’ necessarily involved the right to stay in possession for the rent spec-
ified in the lease.” Id. at 1407. 
503. In re Freeman, 49 F. Supp. 163, 164–65 (S.D. Ga. 1943). 
504. Creedon & Zinman, supra note 502, at 1431 (quoting 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 603–04,
¶3.24(1.1) (14th ed. 1969)). 
505. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 365(h) (1978), with Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 70(b), 52 Stat. 840 
(1938).
506. 11 U.S.C. § 365(h). 
507. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 349 (1977). 
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applicable nonbankruptcy law.”508  The legislative history of the 1994 amend-
ment indicates that it was enacted in response to some courts’ strained limiting 
interpretation of the tenant’s right to “possession” on rejection, and that Con-
gress intended to protect a tenant from having its “rights stripped away if a 
debtor rejects its obligations as a lessor in bankruptcy.”509
The 1994 amendment, similar to the 1978 Code that it amended, said noth-
ing of the non-debtor tenant’s rights on a free and clear sale, and was concerned 
only with the tenant’s rights on rejection.510  Nothing in section 365(h) or any 
other Code provision or the legislative history “clearly indicates” or even sug-
gests any change to the pre-Code law and practice on a sale free and clear, under 
which the parties’ prepetition state law lien and lease priorities remained in 
place, and continued to determine the non-debtor parties’ respective interests in 
the sale property and the proceeds of sale.511
IX. CONCLUSION
The Bankruptcy Code on all of these analyses authorizes a debtor to sell 
property free and clear of a subordinate lease and the tenant’s possessory rights 
under it, even if the lease has been rejected and the tenant has elected to remain 
in possession.  Those decisions that utilize section 365(h) (or sections 363(f)(1) 
and (5) or 361(3)) to vault a subordinate lease ahead of prior mortgages and 
other interests are contrary to the text of section 363(f) regarding free and clear 
sales, sections 361 and 363(e) regarding adequate protection, and section 
365(h).  Those cases also are at odds with the Code’s purposes of equitable 
distribution and maximizing value to creditors, and with more than 130 years 
of unvarying pre-Code law and practice that Congress has not indicated that it 
had changed by the Code or the amendments to it.  Most significantly, those 
cases contravene the parties’ bargained-for, prepetition state law property rights 
that Butner and Nobleman instruct must be preserved and vindicated on the 
filing of a bankruptcy case. 
508. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, sec. 205, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994). 
509. H.R. REP. NO. 103-835, at 45 (1994) (citing In re Carlton Rest., 151 B.R. 353, 354 (Bankr. 
E.D. Pa. 1993) (holding that the tenant’s possessory rights on a rejection under the pre-1994 section 
365(h) were personal, and could not be assigned by the tenant)). 
510. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 205, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994). 
511. BFP v. Resolution Tr. Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 565–66 (1994) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[W]hen 
the Bankruptcy Code is truly silent or ambiguous, it should not be read as departing from previous 
practice.”) (citing Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992); Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54 
(1979)).  Justice Scalia, in his dissent in Dewsnup, also stated his view that the Court should not ven-
erate pre-Code law at the expense of plain statutory meaning. Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 434 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting).  As more particularly set forth in §§ IV and V, the text of sections 363(f) and 365(h) is 
clear and nothing in the Code suggests that a tenant’s rights on a debtor-landlord’s rejection change 
the priorities of liens, leases and other interests on a sale.
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This does not mean that a tenant will always lose on a sale.  A tenant will 
be entitled to the value its lease under section 361(1) or (3) if its lease has pri-
ority, or, if its lease is subordinate, to payment as adequate protection for the 
value of the lease to the extent that sufficient sale proceeds remain after pay-
ment of adequate protection to the holders of prior liens and other interests. 
These outcomes preserve the pre-bankruptcy priorities of the parties’ inter-
ests in the property sold and are those that would result from a foreclosure of a 
mortgage or other monetary lien against the property.  Each of these results 
reflects the value of the parties’ state law interests in the property per Butner
and the adequate protection provisions of the Code. 
The result in those cases that give special treatment to a subordinate lease 
on a free and clear sale is the windfall that Butner decried and the creation of a 
springing interest that Congress sought to prevent.  If a bankruptcy sale can be 
made free and clear of monetary liens and other encumbrances including those 
having first priority against the property, but cannot be made free and clear of 
a subordinate lease, then the subordinate lease will ride through unscathed and 
the holders of  liens and other encumbrances with priority will be penalized.  A 
subordinate lease that is out-of-the-money will be magically transformed into a 
first priority encumbrance against the property, and the price that a buyer will 
be willing to pay for the property will be proportionately lower.  If the sale 
proceeds are insufficient to pay in full the mortgages and other encumbrances 
that have lien priority over the lease, then their holders will be paid at a dis-
count.  The tenant under the below-market lease that is subordinate to those 
mortgages—who should receive nothing if the property is worth less than the 
claims secured by the mortgages—will remain in possession and thus, receive 
the full value of its lease ahead of the holders of those prior mortgages and 
encumbrances.  These interpretations reverse the parties’ state law priorities, 
undermine the uniformity required by Butner, and encourage forum-shopping 
both by a subordinate tenant who will prefer the bankruptcy proceeding because 
it will fare far better there and by a prior mortgagee who can be expected to 
seek stay relief from the bankruptcy court for the purpose foreclosing in a state 
court proceeding in which the priority of its lien will be recognized and pre-
served.
A lease encumbering a debtor’s property should be treated on a free and 
clear sale as what it is: an encumbrance against the property that is prior to some 
interests and subordinate to others.  The tenant is entitled to treatment in ac-
cordance with those priorities.  The result urged by this Article is compelled by 
the text, purposes, and legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code, by Supreme 
Court precedent that defines property interests in a bankruptcy case on the basis 
of state law, and by more than 130 years of pre-Code law and practice that 
Congress has not indicated was changed by enactment of the Bankruptcy Code. 
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This outcome is not dictated by a harsh bankruptcy law or by the coldness 
of a debtor-landlord’s heart.  It is required instead by a bankruptcy law that 
vindicates bargained-for, prepetition state law property rights while maximiz-
ing the value of the debtor’s assets for the equitable distribution to creditors, in 
a manner that is fundamentally fair to the parties. 
